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I. Introduction 
1. The Topic 
In my thesis I study the application S.S. and Others v. Italy filed 3.5.2018 with the European 
Court of Human Rights (the ECtHR, the Court).1 It concerns an incident of 6.11.2017, in 
which a migrant boat, headed for Europe, found itself in distress off the coast of Libya. The 
Libyan Coast Guard failed to rescue all of the migrants from their sinking dinghy, allegedly 
mistreated those they took onboard, and returned them to Libya, thus exposing them not only 
to continued ill-treatment but also to forced return (refoulement) to their countries of origin. 
Some of the migrants lost their lives due to the shortcomings of the rescue operation. The 
applicants claim that Italy is liable for the violations of their human rights, because Italy has 
funded, equipped and trained the Libyan Coast Guard. The Application has passed the initial 
admissibility criteria and has been communicated 26.6.2019 to Italy as the respondent State. 
The larger context of the thesis is the tension between the object of the European Union (EU) 
to create and sustain its ‘area of freedom, security and justice’ with free movement of people 
within, and the EU’s need to limit the number of immigrants coming from outside of the 
Union, often termed ‘mixed migration’. Migration in its various forms has been and 
continues to be a contoversial issue ethically, politically and judicially. The thesis pursues 
to contribute to the discussion by focusing on the recent and topical phenomenon of 
externalization of border management, which is as ingenious as it is contended.  
Fundamentally, the thesis gauges the effectiveness of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR) and the Court as protectors of human rights in instances where the States try 
to circumvent their obligations by ‘outsourcing’ susceptible tasks to non-Convention actors. 
2. Research Questions 
My intention is to first estimate whether the Court finds that the condition of jurisdiction as 
formulated in the Article 1 of the ECHR, and functioning as a ‘threshold’, is fulfilled, and 
whether the Application proceeds to merits. Secondly, I try to assess whether Italy can be 
held liable for violating Article 2 or Article 3 of the ECtHR. A recent judgment of the Court 
 
1 Application no. 21660/18 to the ECtHR (hereafter ‘Application’): S.S. et Autres c. Italie, available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-194748; 26.6.2019. – English translation: Appendix 1. 
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dealing with extraterritorial jurisdiction points out the distinction between the criteria for 
jurisdiction and responsibility: ‘at the outset […] the question whether the facts complained 
of by the applicant […] fall within the jurisdiction of the respondent State and whether they 
are attributable to that State and engage its responsibility are separate matters, the latter two 
having to be determined on an examination on the merits’.2 I rely on this division, asking 
first whether the events fall within Italy’s jurisdiction, and second, if they trigger Italy’s 
responsibility to fulfil its positive obligations. My research question has thus two parts. 
When planning my thesis, I took into account the ‘Questions to the Parties’ and ‘Information 
Request’ to the Parties that the Application contains (see Appendix 1). Within the limited 
scope of the thesis, I mainly reflect on those that resonate with my focused research interest. 
While I could use the Court’s questions as signposts in my analysis, I did not have access to 
the answers provided by the Parties. Therefore, it should be kept in mind that I have not seen 
any counterarguments submitted by the Italian government. This lack of further material 
obviously emphasizes the tentative and hypothetical nature of my thesis. 
3. Methodology and Objective 
The thesis is essentially a doctrinal study. It aims to examine critically the central features 
of the relevant legislation and case law in order to create an arguably correct and sufficiently 
complete statement on the Court’s reasoning.3 The method is a two-part process, which 
involves locating the sources of the law and then interpreting and analysing them.4 Such a 
doctrinal research process can be described as a qualitative rather than a quantitative one. 
The central sources are the provisions of ECHR and the case law of the ECtHR. Additionally, 
there are the general principles of interpretation of the Court. The study is guided by a 
literature review, and some references are made to other sources of international and EU law 
as well as other adjudicating bodies, too. As for the facts of the case, the research is based 
on the Application itself and the available multimedia reconstruction of the events. A central 
reference and source for proof and interpretation is the bilateral agreement between Italy and 
Libya, the so-called Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), included as Appendix 2. 
The Court has not previously decided on a similar issue. At the time of writing, the case is 
still pending. My research method is to create a hypothesis of on what arguments there are 
 
2 Case of Georgia v. Russia (II) 2021, para. 162 
3 Watkins and Burton 2017, p. 13 
4 Hutchinson and Duncan 2012, p. 110 
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concerning its further admissibility and merits. I seek advice from recent journal articles 
with tentative analyses and educated guesses of the outcome of S.S. My objective is to learn 
about how the ECtHR applies its case law and principles to unprecedented claims, and how 
it develops its argumentation. Of main interest are the concept of jurisdiction and the doctrine 
of positive obligations such as they are formulated and understood in human rights law.  
The thesis is, in a way, a case analysis of a case that has not yet been decided. As said, my 
method is therefore prone to uncertainties and even misjudgments. At the same time, I 
deliberately chose this approach exactly because the openness of the case makes it exciting. 
I try to concentrate on the legal issues. As doctrinal legal research can be seen to work 
towards the broader goal of law, which is ultimately justice, I also include some comments 
on the political or ethical aspects of the law and jurisprudence. Political decisions have led 
to the incident of S.S., and the Court’s decision, in turn, can have a large impact on them. 
4. Disposition  
This introductory Chapter I outlines the purpose and scope of the thesis and reflects on the 
choice of research method and on the relevant sources used. The next Chapter II presents the 
Application and the facts of the case as reported. It also aims to situate the case in the broader 
context of the EU migration control and, particularly, describe the relationship between Italy 
and Libya, present their agreements and show the human rights situation in Libya. Chapter 
III introduces the relevant rules, concentrating on those Articles of the ECHR that were 
allegedly breached. The main substantive part – the legal analysis – of the thesis consists of 
the following two chapters. In Chapter IV, I study the question of jurisdiction: how the 
concept is understood in the ECHR and applied by the ECtHR, and most significantly, how 
could the Court find Italy’s ‘extraterritorial’ jurisdiction in the S.S. case. In Chapter V 
follows the speculation of the responsibility and the possible violations of the material 
Articles. The question concerns the positive obligations of Italy: are there violations of the 
Convention because of omissions of duties? To find out this, I apply various criteria or ‘tests’ 
used by the Court: reasonable knowledge and reasonable measures, the condition of 
proximity and the principle of effectiveness. As much as possible, I try to reflect on the 
relevant and recent case law. Lastly, in Chapter VI, I sum up my research and present my 
hypothesis of the Court’s judgment. I also make some remarks of the political pressure the 
Court is under and speculate tentatively on the consequences of the outcome to the EU 
immigration policy at large.  
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II. The Case and the Background 
1. The Application of S.S. and the Others v. Italy  
The application is on behalf of 17 survivors of the incident. The applicants are 16 Nigerian 
nationals and one Ghanaian national. Two of them are also acting on behalf of their minor 
children, who died during the events subject of the application. The application is filed by 
the Global Legal Action Network (GLAN)5 and the Association for Juridical Studies on 
Immigration (ASGI),6 with support from the non-profit Italian Recreative and Cultural 
Association (Associazione Ricreativa e Culturale Italiana, ARCI) and Yale Law School’s 
Lowenstein International Human Rights Clinic.7 The applicants are represented by Violeta 
Moreno Lax, Itamar Mann and C.L. Cecchini and L. Leo. 
2. The Circumstances and Facts of the Case 
The recount of the events is based on the Application8 and a multimedia reconstruction 
‘Mare Clausum’9 created by Forensic Oceanography and Forensic Architecture. It presents 
the evidence compiled by the Search and Rescue Observatory for the Mediterranean 
(SAROBMED)10 of materials provided by the search and rescue (SAR) non-governmental 
organization (NGO) Sea-Watch’s11 vessel Sea Watch 3.  
The reconstruction provides a full timeline of the actions at sea by combining video footage, 
recordings of the radio messages between the actors on scene, and computer-created 
dynamic modelling. The footage is from seven wide-angle cameras mounted on the mast 
and the deck of the Sea Watch 3 vessel and from two cameras mounted on its rigid-hulled 
inflatable boats (RHIB), with an additional clip recorded with a Libyan crew member’s 
phone. The whole reconstruction is available online. 
 
5 GLAN consists of legal practitioners, investigative journalists and academics, who pursue legal actions that 
promote accountability for human rights violations occurring overseas; https://www.glanlaw.org/about-us 
6 ASGI is a membership-based association of lawyers, academics, consultants and civil society 
representatives focusing on all legal aspects of immigration; https://www.asgi.it/chi-siamo/english-version/ 
7 https://www.glanlaw.org/ss-case 
8 Application, paras 2–12: the circumstances of the case 
9 Mare Clausum. The Sea Watch vs Libyan Coast Guard Case: An Investigation by Forensic Oceanography 
(directed by Charles Heller and Lorenzo Pezzani) and Forensic Architecture (April 2018), at 
www.glanlaw.org/ss-case / or at www.forensic-architecture.org/case/sea-watch/ 
10 SAROBMED is an international, multi-disciplinary consortium of researchers, civil society groups, and 
other organisations working in the field of cross-border maritime migration; https://sarobmed.org/ 
11 Sea-Watch is a volunteer project financed through donations and trying to fill the gaps left by the 
institutionalised European sea rescue such as Mare Nostrum; https://sea-watch.org/en/about/ 
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At some point during the night between 5 and 6 November 2017 a rubber dinghy, with 
approximately 130 to 150 people in it, left Tripoli. By around 6 a.m. 6.11., the sea had got 
rough, and the craft started taking in water and found itself in distress off the coast of Libya. 
The passengers contacted the Rome Maritime Coordination and Rescue Center (MRCC) via 
a satellite phone. There were three ships in the vicinity: the rescue vessel Sea Watch 3 
(SW3), the French military vessel Premier Maître l’Her, a part of European Union Naval 
Force Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR MED), and the Libyan coast guard vessel Ras Jadir.  
Patrolling just outside the Libyan contiguous zone, SW3 was closest to the migrants’ craft, 
and was contacted by the Rome MRCC, sending distress signals but no specific location. 
SW3 received authorization join and rescue the craft. The Rome MRCC also informed the 
Libyan coast guard (LYCG), and the French ship offered its aid to SW3 and tried repeatedly 
to contact the LYCG. The Rome MRCC could determine the location through the satellite 
phone provider and passed it on to SW3 at 6.31. The MRCC alerted SW3 that the LYCG 
were present within a radius of nine nautical miles from the migrants’ craft. 
Eventually the LYCG informed SW3 that they would coordinate the rescue on scene, but 
transmitted no further instructions, leaving SW3 and Ras Jadir on their own to solve their 
conflicting imperatives of rescue and interception, which were initiated around 8 o’clock. 
The incidents took place between 20 and 24 nautical miles off the Libyan coast, therefore 
outside Libyan territorial waters. 
The Libyan vessel Ras Jadir sped up in order to intercept the dinghy before SW3, and when 
it reached the half-sunken craft, it was manoeuvred so that the abrupt water movements 
threw several people from the dinghy into the water, causing them to drown.  
At 8.45 a Portuguese airplane (also a part of EUNAVFOR MED) dropped lifejackets, an 
inflatable draft and smoke flares to indicate the location of the distressed dinghy.  
At 9.07 an Italian military helicopter, deployed by a nearby warship (part of the Mare Sicuro 
operation), arrived on the scene and offered SW3 assistance. The crew of the helicopter 
requested SW3 to send a its RHIBs near the migrants’ boat so that the helicopter could safely 
launch its own life raft.  
By 9.30 all the migrants had left their sinking dinghy. Several were dragged on board Ras 
Jadir, but six of them escaped to get to the SW3’s RHIBs. The Libyan crew did not provide 
migrants with life jackets but instead obstructed the rescue operations by throwing objects 
on them. Once they were on board, the crew beat them and threatened them with weapons.  
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At 9.36 Ras Jadir suddenly increased its speed in order to rapidly leave the scene. Still, one 
more person climbed off the board, intending to get to the SW3, and was left hanging on the 
ladder of the accelerating vessel. The Italian helicopter radioed Ras Jadir pleading them 
repeatedly to stop the engines and asking them to cooperate with SW3. Ras Jadir refused, 
claiming to have been designated as the vessel responsible for the on-scene rescue (as the 
On Scene Commander). 
It is estimated that over 20 people died by drowning on scene. Ras Jadir intercepted 47 
migrants, who were reportedly taken to a detention camp in Tajura, Libya, where they were 
subjected to ill-treatment and violence. On a date that has not been specified, they were 
repatriated to Nigeria as part of the voluntary humanitarian return assistance program of the 
International Organization for Migration (IOM). SW3 rescued 59 people and brought them 
to Europe. The crew of SW3 also recovered the bodies of those who died at sea, including 
the bodies of two children, sons of the applicants S.S. and R.J. respectively. 
3. The Claims or Aggrievances 
The applicants complain that the Rome Maritime Coordination and Rescue Center, by 
allowing Ras Jadir to take part in the rescue operations, had exposed them at risk of ill-
treatment and of death, and failed in its positive obligations, thus violating the Articles 2 
(right to life) and 3 (prohibition of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment) 
of the ECHR. There are also alleged violations of Article 4 (prohibition of slavery and forced 
labour), Article 13 (right to an effective remedy) and Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 (prohibition 
of collective expulsion of aliens); see in more detail for Appendix 1.  
My legal analysis and conclusions will concentrate on Article 2 and Article 3. This is partly 
due to the limited scope of the thesis but also, and more importantly, due to their centrality 
in the human rights regime. These articles will be explained first generally in Chapter III and 
then analysed more closely in Chapter V as well as in Chapter VI. 
4. The Context: the ‘Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’ of the EU 
4.1. The Concept of Irregular Migration 
The S.S. case has to be studied, and can only be comprehended, in the context of the EU 
asylum and migration politics and legislation. In the following, I therefore try to sketch the 
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main outlines of these. After that I focus on the position of Italy as an EU Member State that 
bears the brunt of the migration due to its geographic situation and due to the EU law.  
As a general rule, States have the undeniable sovereign right, as a matter of well-established 
international law and subject to their treaty obligations, to control entry, residence and 
expulsion of non-nationals.12 However, it is not less certain that such a right is not absolute, 
because international refugee law and human rights impose limits to the control.13 
The Member States of the EU have relinquished their sovereignty in various degrees leading 
to the creation of a common space through the method of differentiated integration or 
‘variable geometry’.14 The Union shall offer an ‘area of freedom, security and justice’ 
(AFSJ) without internal frontiers in conjunction with appropriate measures with respect to 
external border controls, asylum and immigration,15 and frame a common policy on these 
areas based on solidarity between Member States.16 According to the Schengen 
Agreement,17 the border controls are to be transferred to the common external frontiers.18  
The European Agenda on Migration 201519 makes it clear that the EU should fight criminal 
smuggling networks. On the other hand, the EU has a duty to help displaced persons in need 
of international protection. To achieve an optimal level of protection, multidisciplinary and 
concerted action both at EU level and at national level has been deemed essential.20  
There are two conflicting sets of rules in the EU law concerning asylum seekers. On the one 
hand, unrecognized refugees and asylum seekers are assimilated to the generic category of 
‘third-country nationals’, which renders their entry ‘irregular’ and basically illegal unless 
they can demonstrate compliance with general admission criteria. On the other hand, the EU 
border acquis contains references to human rights and refugee law, which provide special 
treatment must be accorded to those in search of international protection even at the pre-
entry stage. In reality, refugees are routinely compelled to resort to smuggling and trafficking 
to access protection in the EU, for lack of legal alternatives.21 The access to international 
 
12 ECHR Guide 2020: Immigration, p. 6, para 2; see e.g. Saadi v. UK 2008, para. 64 
13 Peers et al., 2015, p. 672 
14 Moreno-Lax 2017, p. 12 
15 TEU, Article 3(2) 
16 TFEU, Article 67 
17 Schengen Agreement, Article 17 
18 Moreno-Lax 2017, p. 20 
19 The European Agenda on Migration, COM(2015) 240 final 
20 Moreno-Lax 2017, p. 27 
21 Ibid., p. 44 
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protection has been made dependent not on the refugee’s need for protection, but perversely 
on the person’s ability to enter clandestinely the territory of a Member State.22 
The Integrated Border Management (IBM) system of the EU comprises a so-called four-tier 
access control model consisting of measures to be implemented in third countries with their 
cooperation, border checks at the external frontiers of the Member States, control within the 
Union, and expulsion upon entry of those without adequate documentation.23 The IBM 
system is developed through the Schengen acquis, but no channels have been opened, as part 
of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS), to guarantee legal access for asylum 
seekers to the EU for the purpose of claiming international protection.24 
‘The external dimension of asylum’ was launched by the Hague Programme.25 According to 
the European Council, ‘the prevention and tackling of irregular migration will help avoid the 
loss of lives of migrants undertaking hazardous journeys’ and therefore, a ‘sustainable 
solution can only be found by intensifying cooperation with countries of origin and transit, 
including through assistance to strengthen their migration and border management 
capacity’.26 The Hague Programme established that it is crucial to strengthen the AFSJ by 
combining control at the external borders, internal security and the prevention of terrorism.27  
4.2. Externalization of Borders 
Externalization, or outsourcing, of border controls has accompanied immigration 
enforcement globally.28 In the European context, the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU) has confirmed that such border and migration enforcement activities can stretch 
beyond the actual territorial borders of the AFSJ.29  
The EU aims for the externalisation through dedicated financial and technical support to 
third countries of origin or transit.30 Often the negotiations involve transit states in the 
enforcement of extraterritorial controls so as to prevent migrants from getting through these 
territories en route to the receiving countries, and the agreements between the EU states and 
 
22 Moreno-Lax 2017, p. 4 
23 Ibid., p. 3 
24 Peers et al. 2015, p. 618 
25 The European Council doc. 16054/04, 13 Dec. 2004, para. 1.6. 
26 Presidency Conclusions, European Council 26–27 June 2014, para. 8; in Peers et al. 2015, p. 619 
27 Moreno-Lax 2017, p. 27 
28 Menjívar 2014, p. 354 
29 Herlin-Karnell 2017, p. 109; see Melki and Abdeli, Joined Cases C-188/10 and C-189/10, and Adil, Case 
C-278/12 PPU 
30 Giuffré and Moreno-Lax 2019, p. 85 
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the transit states involve the training of personnel and transfers of technical and financial 
assistance.31  
Frontex, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, plays a central role in the efforts to 
safeguard the AFSJ by its support at the external borders.32 Frontex operationalizes the link 
Between IBM and the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM). A substantial 
enhancement of Frontex’ powers occurred in the aftermath of the 2015–2016 ‘migration 
crisis’ and resulted in the adoption of the European Border and Coast Guard Regulation.33  
In 2019, the Regulation on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Regulations 
(EBCG)34 was updated. The Regulation defines the components of IBM, one of which is the 
cooperation with third countries, particularly neighbouring countries and on third countries 
of origin or transit for illegal immigration.35 It explicitly encourages the Member States to 
‘cooperate at an operational level with one or more third countries’36 by concluding bilateral 
or multilateral agreements. However, any such agreements shall ‘comply with […] law on 
fundamental rights and on international protection, including the Charter, the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the 1951 
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, the 1967 Protocol thereto, and in particular 
the principle of non-refoulement’.37 
The EU Commission published in September 2020 the ambitious ‘New Pact on Migration 
and Asylum’. It covers a wide range of issues, but the security of the AFSJ is its strong 
overall theme. Pursuant to the new EU Action Plan against migrant smuggling, the 
cooperation between the EU and third countries – countries of origin and of transfer – will 
be further stimulated and strengthened through targeted partnerships as part of broader 
partnerships with key third countries. These include support to countries of transit in 
capacity-building both in terms of law enforcement frameworks and operational capacity, 
encouraging effective action by police and judicial authorities.38 
According to the New Pact, the EU aims to prevent dangerous journeys and irregular 
crossings through ‘tailor-made Counter Migrant Smuggling Partnerships’ with third 
 
31 Menjívar 2014, p. 358 
32 https://frontex.europa.eu/about-frontex/foreword/ 
33 Moreno-Lax 2017, p. 153–157 
34 Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2019 on the 
European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1052/2013 and (EU) 2016/1624 
35 Ibid., Article 3(1)(g) 
36 Ibid., Article 72(1) 
37 Ibid., Article 72(3) 
38 Communication from the Commission on a New Pact on Migration and Asylum, COM(2020) 609 final, p. 16 
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countries.39 A critical step forward is the ‘swift and full implementation of the new EBCG 
Regulation’.40 Because the disembarkation of migrants has a significant impact on asylum, 
migration and border management, in particular on coastal Member States, it is deemed 
crucial to develop an even more coordinated EU approach to the search and rescue practices 
– grounded in solidarity.41 
The struggle for solidarity in handling the asylum and migration issues has been a consistent 
challenge for the EU. The increased migration flows of 2015 and 2016 exposed the flaws in 
the EU rules for asylum procedure, the so-called Dublin system, which places the 
responsibility for asylum claims on member states of first entry and puts a disproportionally 
heavy pressure on the institutions of certain southern Member States.42 This has pushed more 
people into dangerous irregular migration routes. Besides solidarity among the Member 
States, the Commission’s new plan emphasizes cooperation with third countries by 
encouraging them to host refugees and migrants, providing them with support to do that, and 
boosting their own enforcement against smuggling.43 
A joint statement published soon after the launch of the Pact, signed by nearly one hundred 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs),44 contains severe criticism of the proposed 
regulations, directives and overall policies. According to the statement ‘the overriding 
objective of the Pact is clear: an increase in the number of people who are returned or 
deported from Europe’. There is a continuing tension between the ‘rhetorical commitment 
to mutually beneficial international partnerships’ and attempts to externalise responsibility 
for asylum. In the opinion of the NGOs, the proposals prioritizes externalisation, deterrence 
and return over procedural guarantees and fundamental rights. Instead of truly establishing 
a system of solidarity among the EU Member States, the NGOs fear that the procedural 
reforms only exacerbate the pressure on Member States at the Union’s external border. The 
NGOs reiterate the concerns about the use of concept of ‘safe third country’, which has been 
discussed extensively before.  
 
39 Communication from the Commission on a New Pact on Migration and Asylum, COM(2020) 609 final, p. 14 
40 Ibid., p. 12 
41 Ibid., p. 13 
42 Rue and Yayboke 2020 
43 Ibid. 
44 Joint Statement: The Pact on Migration and Asylum: to provide a fresh start and avoid past mistakes, risky 
elements need to be addressed and positive aspects need to be expanded; 6th October 2020. At 
https://www.ecre.org/the-pact-on-migration-and-asylum-to-provide-a-fresh-start-and-avoid-past-mistakes-
risky-elements-need-to-be-addressed-and-positive-aspects-need-to-be-expanded/ 
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In my final conclusions, I will come back to the New Pact proposed by the EU Commission. 
I will try to assess the possible impact that the Court’s decision in S.S. might have on the 
new and amended legislative framework.  
4.3. The Issue of Maritime Borders 
The situation at the maritime borders of the European AFSJ has caused trouble for long, and 
is of acute interest to Italy. Trying to curb the migration flows, the EU and the Member 
States have resorted to several forceful blocking mechanism, of which maritime interdiction 
is an explicit example.45 The focus has been on the Mediterranean, but a recent development 
– at the time of writing – is the increased number of migrant boats sailing from West Africa 
to the Canary Islands, a long and perilous route over the Atlantic. Only a fraction of the total 
unauthorized immigration in the EU is detected at the moment of entry, and the irregular sea 
crossings represent a relatively small portion of total arrivals, but on the other hand, the 
majority of border deaths occur at sea.46   
Three general models of migrant interdiction by the EU Member States can be identified. 
The first comprises joint operations in territorial waters of a third country. Spain and Italy 
have concluded agreements with several North African countries which allow them to 
participate in border patrols in the territorial seas of those third countries.47 The second group 
of interdiction practices comprises so-called ‘push-backs’: the interdiction and summary 
return of migrants to a third country, often undertaken on the high seas with the presumption 
that the third state is willing to accept the return of the migrants.48 These are exemplified by 
the case of Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy discussed below. The S.S. case belongs to the 
third model of interdiction: rescue operations of migrants who are in distress at sea, followed 
by disembarkation in a third country – ‘pull-back’ operations, which are by their nature 
conducted on an ad hoc basis.49 
The EU Member States have concluded amongst themselves and with third countries treaties 
that are analogical with bilateral treaties concluded for the suppression of drug trafficking. 
These treaties grant permission for the interdiction of such vessels on the high seas which 
are suspected of carrying undocumented migrants. The EU Member States have also 
 
45 Moreno-Lax 2017, p. 4 
46 Ibid., p. 188 
47 Den Heijer 2012, p. 212 
48 Ibid., p. 213 
49 Ibid., p. 215 
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circumvented the rule of flag-state consent by interdicting migrant vessels under the pretext 
of SAR operations, despite the demands of those on board the vessel.50 An additional 
problem is posed by the fact that many migrants cross the Mediterranean on board stateless 
vessels. The European Commission has posited that a the States may prevent the further 
passage of a stateless vessel, arrest and seize it, or escort it to a port.51  
According to the Maritime Surveillance Regulation (MSR),52 the EU States shall cooperate 
with the responsible Rescue Coordination Centre (RCC) to identify a place of safety and, 
when the responsible RCC designates such a place of safety, they shall ensure that 
disembarkation of the rescued persons is carried out rapidly and effectively.53 The place of 
safety is defined as ‘a location where rescue operations are considered to terminate and 
where the survivors’ safety of life is not threatened, where their basic human needs can be 
met and from which transportation arrangements can be made for the survivors’ next 
destination or final destination, taking into account the protection of their fundamental rights 
in compliance with the principle of non-refoulement’.54 
However, the principle of non-refoulement is formulated as an exception to the rule of 
disembarkation ‘in the third country from which the vessel is assumed to have departed’: 
only ‘[i]f that is not possible’ (due to legal or factual impediments), will interdicted/ rescued 
persons be brought to EU territory.55 Non-rescue episodes and incidents of refoulement take 
place due to disagreement as to the content and extent of obligations accruing in the maritime 
context. Interdiction has been conflated with SAR operations, the obligations of which are 
interpreted as applying independently from human rights.56  
4.4. Italy and Libya 
Italy’s geographical position at the border of the EU and right on the Mediterranean have 
made it one of the most attractive ports of entry to Europe.57 Italy has been increasingly 
vocal regarding its need for a solution to the heavy fluxes of migrants crossing the 
 
50 Den Heijer 2012, p. 222 
51 Ibid., p. 224; Article 92(1) UNCLOS: each vessel sailing the high seas must have a nationality and fly a flag 
52 Regulation (EU) No 656/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing 
rules for the surveillance of the external sea borders in the context of operational cooperation coordinated by 
the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the 
Member States of the European Union (MSR). – See further Chapter III. 
53 MSR, Article 10(1)(c) 
54 Ibid., Article 2(12) 
55 Ibid., Article 10(1); Moreno-Lax 2017, p. 198 
56 Moreno-Lax 2017, p. 188 
57 Vari 2020, p. 108–109 
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Mediterranean to reach its borders, and continued to stress that it could not bear the burden 
of helping and taking illegal migrants in such large numbers, and called for the EU to provide 
a durable solution in many occasions.58 
Italy colonized Libya for nearly forty years in the early 1900s and left the country in 1951 
in dire conditions. The discovery of oil brought more business into Libya, but also corruption 
and division, which resulted in the 1969 populist revolution led by Colonel Moammar 
Gaddafi. The international community began to see Libya as a sponsor of terrorism, and 
when the so-called Arab Spring started in 2011, with North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s 
(NATO) intervention on the side of Libyans, Gaddafi’s government was overturned and he 
was killed shortly thereafter.59 Following the 42-year-long government of Gaddafi, Libya 
has been more or less in a status of chaos: armed militias control various cities and regions 
of the country and engage in contraband, human trafficking, and smuggling of migrants and 
supplies. The General National Congress (GNC), an Islamist-led administration based in 
Tripoli challenges the authority of the present Libyan Government of National Accord 
(GNA), making it difficult for it to gain full control over Libya.60 
The cooperation and collaboration between Italy and Libya on migration and border control 
was formalised during the early 2000s, when several agreements focused on curbing 
migratory flows and enhancing readmission were concluded.61 In 2008 Italy and Libya 
signed a Treaty of Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation aimed at preventing irregular 
migration from Libya to Italy.62  
The unrest in Libya following the Arab Spring temporarily halted the efforts to partnerships 
or agreements, and the Treaty was formally suspended in 2012 after the ECtHR decision of 
Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy.63 This push-back case concerned Somalian and Eritrean 
migrants, travelling from Libya, who were intercepted at sea by the Italian authorities and 
 
58 Vari 2020, p. 114 
59 Ibid., p. 107–108 
60 Ibid., p. 106, 109 
61 See Paoletti, E.: The Migration of Power and North-South Inequalities (2010, Palgrave Macmillan);  
Ronzitti, N.: ‘The Treaty on Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation between Italy and Libya: New 
Prospects for Cooperation in the Mediterranean?’ (2009) 1 Bulletin of Italian Politics 1, 125 
62 Legge 6 febbraio 2009, n. 7 Ratifica ed esecuzione del Trattato di amicizia, partenariato e cooperazione tra 
la Repubblica italiana e la Grande Giamahiria araba libica popolare socialista, fatto a Bengasi il 30 agosto 
2008 (GU n. 40 del 18-2-2009); available (in Italian) at https://www.normattiva.it/uri-
res/N2Ls?urn:nir:stato:legge:2009;7.   
63 2012, Application no. 27765/09 
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sent by an Italian vessel back to Libya in a course of action precisely provided for by the 
Additional Technical Protocols of the aforementioned 2008 Treaty of Friendship.64  
The Court held unanimously that the applicants fell within the jurisdiction of Italy for the 
purposes of Article 1 of the ECHR,65 and found that Italy had violated the principle of non-
refoulement implied in Article 3 and the prohibition of collective expulsion of Article 4 of 
Protocol 4 of the ECHR. According to the judgment, Italy cannot evade its own 
responsibility by relying on its obligations arising out of bilateral agreements with Libya: 
even if it such agreements made express provision for the return to Libya of migrants 
intercepted on the high seas, Italy’s responsibility continues after having entered into treaty 
commitments subsequent to the entry into force of the ECHR.66 The Court noted that 
jurisdiction is interpreted to apply also extraterritorially, and because the Convention must 
be interpreted as a whole, the expulsion can neither be interpreted only territorially.67  
When the number of migrants reaching Europe increased sharply 2015, the cooperation with 
the Libyan authorities resumed. The EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia was launched in 
June 2015 under Italian overall command in order to provide training to Libyan Coast Guard 
(LYCG) personnel.68 The mission core mandate of Operation Sophia is to ‘undertake 
systematic efforts to identify, capture and dispose of vessels and enabling assets used or 
suspected of being used by migrant smugglers or traffickers’.69  
In 2016, the Council extended Operation Sophia’s mandate reinforcing it by adding the 
supporting task of training of the Libyan coastguards and navy. The Italian Coast Guard 
assumed the leadership of a project to establish a Libyan MRCC and support the Libyan 
authorities in identifying and declaring their Search and Rescue (SAR) Region.70 
 
64 Protocollo aggiuntivo tecnico-operativo al Protocollo di Cooperazione tra la Repubblica Italiana e la Gran 
Giamahiria Araba Libica Popolare Socialista, per fronteggiare il fenomeno dell’immigrazione clandestina, 
signed on 29.12.2007; available (in Italian) at 
https://www.meltingpot.org/IMG/pdf/Protocollo_operativo_Italia_Libia_2007.pdf 
65 Press release issued by the Registrar of the Court, ECHR 075 (2012), 23.2.2012 
66 Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy 2012, para. 129 
67 Ibid., para. 178 
68 Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/778 of 18 May 2015 on a European Union military operation in the 
Southern Central Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR MED), L 122/31 
69 https://www.operationsophia.eu/about-us/ 
70 See European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 
‘Join Communication to the European Parliament, the European Council and the Council. Migration on the 
Central Mediterranean route: Managing flows, saving lives’ (25.1.2017) 
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4.5. The Memorandum of Understanding of 2017 
A central document for the S.S. case is the bilateral agreement titled ‘Memorandum of 
Understanding on Cooperation on Development, Combating Illegal Immigration, Human 
Trafficking and Smuggling, and on Strengthening Border Security’ (MoU; see Appendix 
2).71 The MoU effectively reflects the earlier Treaty of Friendship, Partnership and 
Cooperation of 2008, highlights the importance of Libyan land and sea borders’ control and 
security, and strengthens the decisive influence of the Italian Government on Libya.72 
On the eve of the February 2017 EU summit in Malta, the President of the EU Council 
Donald Tusk promised the closure of the Central Mediterranean migration route into Europe. 
The summit led to the signing of the MoU between the Italian government and the GNA, 
endorsed by the EU in its Malta Declaration.73  
In May 2017, Italy provided the LYCG with four fast patrol boats, and a few months later, 
further six boats, increasing significantly the operational capacity of the LYCG.74 One of the 
vessels handed over to Libya by Italy is Ras Jadir, involved in S.S., and eight out of its 
thirteen crew members on board were trained by the EUNAFVOR MED.75 In June 2017, the 
Italian Coast Guard was awarded a  € 44 million grant for the assessment of the LYCG legal 
framework and capability in terms of SAR Services by the European Commission.76  
Following Italian recommendations, the Libyan authorities unilaterally declared the Libyan 
SAR zone. Although the Italian Coast Guard indicated that the Libyan Maritime Rescue 
Coordination Center (MRCC) would not have been fully operational until at least 2020,77 
Italy and the EU have increasingly withdrawn their naval assets from the Central 
Mediterranean, forcing the LYCG to become the primary responsible actor.78  
Within the unilaterally declared SAR zone Libya then claimed responsibility to coordinate 
rescue operations and has since threatened repeatedly NGO vessels to enter it.79 While in 
 
71 English translation at https://eumigrationlawblog.eu/wpcontent/uploads/2017/10/MEMORANDUM_ 
translation_finalversion.doc.pdf, see Appendix 2 
72 Moreno-Lax 2017, p. 109 
73 Nakache and Losier 2017; see Malta Declaration by the members of the European Council on the external 
aspects of migration: addressing the Central Mediterranean route, European Council 3.2.2017, 
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/02/03/malta-declaration/ 
74 Vari 2020, p. 110 
75 Reconstruction by Forensic Oceanography and Forensic Architecture 
76 Ibid., p. 111 
77 Under the rules of the International Maritime Organization (IMO), a country can assert a SAR region only 
if it has a 24-hour MRCC staffed by English-speakers. 
78 The New Humanitarian, https://deeply.thenewhumanitarian.org/refugees/executive-summaries/2017/12/14 
79 Reconstruction by Forensic Oceanography and Forensic Architecture 
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2016 NGOs had been the main search and rescue actor in the Mediterranean, by the end of 
2017 the Libyan Coast Guard intercepted more migrants than any other actor.80 The EU and 
Italy de facto re-established the LYCG, which before was unable or unwilling to intercept 
migrants leaving the Libyan shores.81 The search and rescue missions have effectively turned 
into operations of exit control. In 2017, the LYCG could perform as many as 19,452 pull-
backs due to their material contribution and close involvement in the internal command-and-
control structure of the Libyan forces.82 
Especially since the signature of the MoU the delivery of training, equipment, and assets has 
intensified. Italy has created a dedicated ‘Africa Fund’, € 2.5 million of which has been 
allocated to the maintenance of LYCG boats and the training of their crews.83 The EU has 
committed € 46 million to prop up Libyan interdiction capacity.84 It has been calculated that 
the total combined investment by Italy and the EU will be € 285 million by 2023.85 In 
addition, an extension of the Mare Sicuro Operation called NAURAS86 was approved by the 
Italian Parliament in August 2017, consisting of four ships, four helicopters, and 600 
servicemen deployed at sea or stationed in Tripoli harbour.87 
There have also been reports that Italy has indirectly paid irregular armed militias to provide 
control over migration fluxes and negotiated with them through mayors and local leaders in 
order to gain their support.88 Italy finances the GNA, but the government makes deals with 
the militias and pays them to accomplish the goals of the MoU.89 This might mean that the 
smugglers who were previously paid by migrants to cross the Mediterranean are instead 
being indirecty paid by Italy to prevent them from smuggling.90 
 
80 See IOM data at http://www.globaldtm.info/libya/ 
81 Ibid. 
82 Moreno-Lax and Lemberg-Pedersen 2019, p. 12; source: IOM, Maritime Update Libyan Coast, 25.10.–
28.11.2017, www.iom.int/sites/default/files/situation_reports/file/IOM-Libya-Maritime-Update-Libyan-
25Oct-28Nov.pdf 
83 Moreno-Lax and Lemberg-Pedersen 2019, p. 26 
84 European Commission, EU Cooperation on Migration in Libya 8.5.2018, at 
https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/eutf-noa-ly-08052018.pdf. 
85 EU and Italy put Aside €285m to Boost Libyan Coast Guard’ EU Observer 29.11.2017, at 
https://euobserver.com/migration/140067 
86 Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre Rome, Guardia Costiera Italiana, Annual Report 2017, at 
www.guardiacostiera.gov.it/attivita/Documents/attivita-sarimmigrazione-
2017/Rapporto_annuale_2017_ENG.pdf 
87 Moreno-Lax and Lemberg-Pedersen 2019, p. 28 
88 Vari 2020, p. 118; see Matthew Herbert and Jalel Harchaoui, ‘Italy claims it’s found a solution to Europe’s 
migrant problem. Here’s why Italy’s wrong’, Washington Post 26.9.2017, at 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/09/25/italy-claims-its-founda-solution-to-
europes-migrant-problem-heres-why-italys-wrong/?utm_term=.42e3781b8114 
89 Vari 2020, p. 120 
90 Ibid., p. 119 
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The MoU itself is only three pages long and constitutes of eight articles. According to Article 
1(B), the Italian party ‘provides support and financing to development programs in the 
regions affected by the illegal immigration phenomenon’.91 In order to fight illegal 
immigration, ‘the Italian party commits to provide technical and technologic support to the 
Libyan institutions […] represented by the border guard and the coast guard’.92 Article 4 
states that ‘The Italian party provides the financing of the initiatives mentioned in this 
Memorandum’. 
The MoU does not expressly specify that Libyan authorities should intercept migrants 
already en route to Italy and at sea, but this can be inferred from the text of the Article 1. It 
is equally likely that Libya will be intercepting boats before they reach Italian territorial 
waters. By mentioning funding for organizations in Libya that engage in the return – whether 
voluntary or forcible – of migrants to their country of origin, Article 2 explicitly identifies 
forcible returns (refoulement) as one of its main goals. The MoU does not mention actions 
to identify potential refugees among the migrants or to ensure that those returned are headed 
to a safe country;93 actually the MoU does not even contain the words ‘refugee’ or ‘legal 
migration,’ but instead only uses the blanket term of illegal immigration.94  
In Article 5 it is summarily stated that ‘The Parties commit to interpret and apply the present 
Memorandum in respect of the international obligations and the human rights agreements of 
which the two Countries are part of’.  
All in all, the MoU can be seen as a containment scheme designed to outsource responsibility 
of controls and to thwart departures or forestall exit. Its ultimate goal can be regarded as an 
effort to sever the jurisdictional link with the EU and Italy.95 In my opinion it is a central 
source of law, or alternatively evidence, for the S.S. case. 
The outcome of the case at hand notwithstanding, it is not premature to say that the ‘more 
controls’ policies exemplified by the MoU have not translated into ‘more deterrence’: 
available information suggests that the migrants divert towards more perilous routes where 
the risk of injury and loss of life multiplies.96 The MoU has been judged by a national 
Criminal Court to be not conform to the Italian Constitution and to international laws, and it 
 
91 MoU Article 1(B), see Appendix 2 
92 Ibid., Article 1(C) 
93 Vari 2020, p. 113–114 
94 Ibid., p. 116 
95 Giuffré and Moreno-Lax 2019, p. 85 
96 Moreno-Lax 2017, p. 198–199 
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has been opposed by numerous associations as well as the Council of Europe Commissioner 
for Human Rights. Despite this, the MoU was renewed in February 2020.97  
4.6. Libya is Not a Safe Third Country 
The MoU has been compared to the probably better-known agreement between the EU and 
Turkey.98 Asylum seekers and irregular migrants who reached Greece could be returned to 
Turkey for a € 6 billion payment. Turkey has been accused of failing to provide adequate 
assistance to refugees, and the EU has been engaging in the refoulement of refugees by 
transferring asylum seekers from Greece to Turkey, justifying its actions by claiming that 
Turkey is in fact a safe country.99 Still, in contrast to the MoU, the arrangement with Turkey 
documents funding amounts, projects and partners in detail, and has included resettlement 
operations and the active participation of the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR).100 
In the Application, a reference is made to UNHCR’s position on returns to Libya from 
September 2018. Even before the current unrest and insecurity, UNHCR has considered that 
Libya should not be regarded as a ‘safe third country’ in light of the absence of a functioning 
asylum system, the widely reported difficulties and abuses faced by asylum-seekers and 
refugees, the absence of protection from such abuses, and the lack of protection against 
refoulement. This is emphasized in the position of 2018 as well as in later updates by 
UNHCR. Libya is not party to the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees or its 
Protocol and, in spite of having ratified the 1969 Organisation of African Unity (OAU) 
Convention relating to refugees, it does not have a functioning national asylum system. 
Applicable Libyan laws criminalize all irregular entry, stay or exit,101 leaving persons in 
need of international protection without the rights attached to asylum.102  
The conditions of Libyan detention facilities fail to meet international standards and have 
been described variously as ‘horrendous’ or ‘cruel, inhuman and degrading’.103 Asylum-
 
97 ASGI, Access to the Territory and Push Backs, 2020. – The sentence of the Criminal Court of Trapani 
23.5.2019 states that according to article 80 of the Italian Constitution, political agreements can be signed 
only with Parliament's authorization; the MoU is also concluded with a party, the Libyan coastguard, re-
peatedly referred to as responsible for crimes against humanity (available in Italian at: https://bit.ly/3dutMHl) 
98 EU-Turkey statement 18.3.2016, at https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-
releases/2016/03/18/eu-turkey-statement/ 
99 Vari 2020, p. 115 
100 Vari 2020, p. 116 
101 UNHCR: Position on the Designations of Libya as a Safe Third Country and as a Place of Safety for the 
Purpose of Disembarkation Following Rescue at Sea, September 2020, p. 6 
102 Ibid., p. 16. – See also Chapter III. 
103 HRW, Libya: Nightmarish Detention for Migrants, Asylum Seekers, 21 January 2019, 
https://bit.ly/2SXU3WE 
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seekers, refugees and migrants, including children, are subjected to torture and other forms 
of ill-treatment, including rape and other forms of sexual violence, forced labour, forced 
recruitment, as well as extortion, both in official and unofficial detention facilities. Those 
detained have no possibility to challenge the legality of their detention or treatment.104 
In the context of rescue at sea and in line with international maritime law – including the EU 
Maritime Surveillance Regulation – disembarkation is to occur in a predictable manner in a 
place of safety and in conditions that uphold respect for the human rights of those who are 
rescued, including adherence to the principle of non-refoulement.105 When persons are 
rescued at sea, including by military and commercial vessels, ‘the need to avoid 
disembarkation in territories where [their] lives and freedoms (…) would be threatened’ is 
relevant in determining what constitutes a place of safety.106  
In sum, UNHCR does not consider that Libya meets the criteria for being designated as a 
place of safety for the purpose of disembarkation following rescue at sea, and therefore calls 
on States to refrain from returning to Libya any persons rescued at sea and to ensure their 
timely disembarkation in a place of safety.107  
Besides by UNHCR, the consequences for migrants who are intercepted, pushed back, 
pulled back, or otherwise returned to Libya have been continuously documented also by the 
United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) and the UN Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), as well as the UN Secretary General.108 These 
views are emphasised by the third-party interveners in the S.S. case, too, as explained below 
in Chapter VI. 
  
 
104 UNHCR: Position on the Designations of Libya as a Safe Third Country, p. 7 
105 Ibid., p. 17; see e.g. IMO, Resolutions MSC.155(78) and MSC.167(78) and International Convention on 
Maritime Search and Rescue 1403 UNTS, Annex, para. 1.3.2. 
106 IMO, Resolution MSC.167(78), para. 6.17 
107 UNHCR: Position on the Designations of Libya as a Safe Third Country, p. 17 
108 See inter alia UNSMIL and OHCHR, Desperate and Dangerous: Report on the human rights situation of 
migrants and refugees in Libya (n 88); United Nations Security Council, ‘United Nations Support Mission in 
Libya, Report of the Secretary-General’ (26 August 2019) UN Doc S/2019/682 
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III. Rules 
1. The Relevant International and EU Law 
The ECtHR interprets the Articles of the ECHR, of which the thesis focuses on Article 2 and 
Article 3. Unlike S.S., in many cases the Court’s process is preceded by national procedures, 
in which relevant domestic rules have been applied. This relates also to one of the 
admissibility criteria stated in Article 34 ECHR, namely that the Court may only deal with 
a matter after all domestic remedies have been exhausted.  
The Court has also consistently held that the Convention does not exist in a vacuum and 
States necessarily remain bound by and must give effect to their other obligations under 
international law when implementing the Convention.109 Thus, other provisions than the 
ECHR can be invoked by both the applicant(s) and by the respondent government(s), as well 
as by the third-party interveners, to back up the submissions. I give first an overall picture 
of such relevant aspects of international and EU law that are referred to in the Application 
or in the intervener’s statements, supplemented by some provisions that the Court has 
referred to in the important Hirsi Jamaa judgment. After this, I move on to the ECHR. 
When constituting and developing the AFSJ, the EU and its Member States must have 
respect for fundamental rights.110 They are expressed in the Charter of the European Union, 
and they also translate general principles of EU law flowing from the ECHR as well as the 
relevant international standards concerning asylum formulated in the Convention on the 
Status of Refugees (CSR).111 International law as a matter of jus cogens or customary norms 
imposes further obligations on the EU and its Member States. These intertwined sources of 
law must be taken into account when interpreting, applying, or implementing IBM rules.112  
With regard to the duty of non-refoulement stipulated by Article 3 ECHR, several other 
sources can be appraised. Article 33(1) CSR declares that ‘[n]o Contracting State shall expel 
or return (refouler) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where 
his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion’. The United Nations 
 
109 See for example Pini and Others v. Romania 2014, para. 138; Marguš v. Croatia 2014, para. 129 
110 TEU Article 6(1); TFEU Article 67.1 
111 TFEU Article 78(1); the UN Convention of 28 July 1951 and the Protocol of 31 January 1967 relating to 
the status of refugees 
112 Moreno-Lax 2017, p. 205 
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Convention against Torture (UNCAT)113 Article 3(1) expresses the prohibition to expel, 
return or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing 
that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture. A similar duty is codified in Articles 
4, 18 and 19 of the Charter of the EU and is ‘applicable in all situations governed by 
European Union law’.114 Finally, UNHCR recalls that the principle of non-refoulement 
applies wherever a state exercises jurisdiction, including where it exercises effective control 
in the context of SAR operations outside its territory.115  
Another crucial right is the right to leave any country including one’s own. It can be seen as 
complementary to the prohibition of forceful return, and is likewise affirmed by several 
sources. The provisions include Article 12(2) of the the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR),116 Article 13(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights117 
and Article 5 of the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination118. The right is inevitably linked with the right to seek and enjoy asylum, 
which, in turn, is enshrined in Article 14(1) of the Declaration and in the CSR and its 1967 
Protocol. Both rights are arguably norms of customary international law.119 
The obligation to come to the assistance of those in distress at sea is a general obligation to 
preserve life at sea regardless of the persons’ nationality, legal status, or the circumstances 
in which they are found.120 This is evident in the the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(the Montego Bay Convention / UNCLOS) that was invoked in Hirsi Jamaa and is referred 
to by interveners in S.S. In the Application and by the interveners in S.S., references are also 
made to the International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (amended; SAR 
Convention) and to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea of (amended; 
SOLAS). In the EU, surveillance and obligations in cases of distress at sea are further 
stipulated by the MSR. The Regulation has separate provisions for interdiction in the 
territorial waters or contiguous zone of the EU Member States121 and for interdiction on the 
high seas.122 In the case of SAR situations the Member States are obliged to render assistance 
 
113 The Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment  
114 Moreno-Lax 2017, p. 248 
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to any vessel or person in distress at sea regardless of the nationality or the circumstances in 
which that person is found.123  
In Hirsi Jamaa, also the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, 
supplementing the UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (the Palermo 
Protocol) was invoked. Article 19(1) provides that nothing in the Protocol ‘shall affect the 
other rights, obligations and responsibilities of States and individuals under international law 
[…] in particular, where applicable, the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to 
the Status of Refugees and the principle of non-refoulement as contained therein.’ 
Finally, the Resolution of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe124 can be of 
relevance. It provides that the Member States, when conducting maritime border 
surveillance operations in the context of preventing smuggling and trafficking or of border 
management, be it in the exercise of de jure or de facto jurisdiction, are requested to (9.1) 
‘fulfil without exception and without delay their obligation to save people in distress at sea’‚ 
to (9.2) ‘ensure that their border management policies and activities, including interception 
measures, recognise the mixed make-up of flows of individuals attempting to cross maritime 
borders’; and (9.3) ‘guarantee for all intercepted persons humane treatment and systematic 
respect for their human rights, including the principle of non-refoulement, regardless of 
whether interception measures are implemented within their own territorial waters, those of 
another State on the basis of an ad hoc bilateral agreement, or on the high seas’. 
2. The ECHR and Asylum Seekers 
At the outset, it can be noted that the impact of the ECHR on the Common European Asylum 
System (CEAS) is probably more incisive than on any other field of EU law.125 All the EU 
Member States are parties of the Convention, and the Union has an obligation to accede to 
the ECHR and subject itself to the oversight of the Court (ECtHR).126 However, few 
provisions of the Convention and its Protocols explicitly concern ‘aliens’ and they do not 
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contain a right to asylum;127 nor does the Court examine the actual asylum application or 
verify how the States honour their obligations under the CSR or the EU law.128  
Extradition, expulsion and ‘any other measure pursuing that aim’ may nonetheless amount 
to refoulement, if the effect of the measure is ‘to prevent migrants from reaching the borders 
of the State’, regardless of whether it is initiated ‘from the national territory of the States 
Parties to the Convention’.129 Thus, the expulsion of an alien by a Contracting State may 
give rise to an issue under Articles 2 and 3 and engage the responsibility of that State, 
implying an obligation not to deport the person in question.130 While the majority of removal 
cases examined by the Court under Articles 2 or 3 concern removals to the country from 
which the applicant has fled, such cases may also arise in connection with the applicant’s 
removal to a third country such as a country of transit, as is the case in S.S.131 Additionally, 
the right to leave one’s country is found also in the ECHR as Article 2(2) of Protocol No. 4. 
The absence or sparsity of particular provisions concerning asylum seekers notwithstanding, 
it is important to remember that the 1 Article obliges the Parties to secure the rights to 
everyone within their jurisdiction. This is why the question of jurisdiction is salient in S.S. 
3. The ECHR Articles Pertaining to the S.S. Case 
The Application claims that in S.S., there are violations of Articles 2, 3, 4 and 13 of the 
ECHR, as well as of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4. I explain all these briefly here, but as I have 
mentioned, in my legal analysis and conclusions concentrate on Article 2 and Article 3.  
The right to life of the Article 2 admits no derogation under peacetime132 and has express 
and specific limitation clauses in the second paragraph. There are three narrowly 
circumscribed exceptions to the right: deprivation of life which is the result of an absolutely 
necessary use of force in defence of any person from unlawful violence, in order to effect a 
lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained, or in action lawfully 
taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection.133 The enumerated exceptions are 
primarily concerned with the use of force that is necessary for legitimate ends but that may 
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have deprivation of life as an unintended outcome; otherwise the Article is absolute: if none 
of the exceptions applies, there is no justification of State acts leading to someone’s death.134 
The prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment of Article 3 is 
a fully non-derogable (an ‘absolutely absolute’) right. According to the Court, the 
Convention prohibits such treatment even in extreme emergency situations.135 Ratione 
personae not only refugees, but everyone is covered by Article 3 regardless of the physical 
location of the person: in contrast to the CSR, the crossing of an international frontier is not 
a prerequisite for Article 3 to apply, and limitations as to legal status for the purposes of 
protection against refoulement under that provision are also forbidden.136 Ratione materiae, 
again contrary to CSR, the grounds on account of which the proscribed treatment may be 
inflicted under Article 3 are without consequence, and no particular reason has to be 
adduced. All kinds of ill-treatment on account of any reason are forbidden without any 
limitations or derogations.137 Neither can the applicant’s past conduct, however undesirable 
or dangerous, be a relevant material consideration.138 
Where the individual has an ‘arguable complaint’ that his removal would expose him to 
treatment contrary to Article 2 or 3 of the Convention, he must have an effective remedy, in 
practice as well as in law. Article 13 imperatively requires, inter alia, independent and 
rigorous scrutiny of any claim that there exist substantial grounds for fearing a real risk of 
treatment contrary to Articles 2 or 3 and automatic suspensive effect.139 Article 13 gives 
expression to the States’ obligation to protect human rights first and foremost within their 
own legal system and establishes an additional guarantee for an individual in order to ensure 
that he or she effectively enjoys those rights.140 
In conjunction with or in the light of Article 3, the requirements of Article 13 are broader 
than a State’s obligation under Article 3 to conduct an effective investigation into the 
disappearance of a person who has been shown to be under their control.141 Although no 
express provision exists in the ECHR to proceed to a ‘prompt and impartial investigation’,142 
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in the Court’s view such a requirement is implicit in the notion of an effective remedy under 
Article 13.143 Particularly with regard to asylum and expulsion cases, Article 13 sets the 
requirements for a substantive and rigorous scrutiny as well as effective remedies, given the 
irreversible nature of the harm that can occur if the alleged risk of ill-treatment 
materialized.144  
As for Article 4 on slavery and forced labour, the Court has held that States have positive 
obligations to put in place a legislative and administrative framework and to take operational 
measures, as well as the procedural positive obligation to investigate. In the context of 
migration, of special weight can be regarded the requirement to put in place adequate 
measures regulating businesses used as a cover for human trafficking.145 
The ‘collective expulsion’ of  Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 is to be understood as ‘any measure 
compelling aliens, as a group, to leave the country, except where such a measure is taken on 
the basis of a reasonable and objective examination of the particular case of each individual 
alien of the group’.146 The notion of expulsion, like the concept of jurisdiction, is principally 
territorial, but where the Court found that a State had, exceptionally, exercised its jurisdiction 
outside its national territory, it could accept that the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction 
by that State had taken the form of collective expulsion.147 
Since the first case in which the Court found that there had been a collective expulsion of 
aliens,148 a violation of Article 13 in conjunction with Article 4 of Protocol 4 have been 
present in number of cases.149 This is an unevitable corollary of the EU policy, which 
assimilates refugees and asylum seekers to the generic category of third-country nationals.  
4. About the Interpretation Principles of the ECtHR 
When interpreting and applying the provisions of the Convention, the Court follows certain 
settled principles. The most significant of them is the principle of effectiviness stated in 
Article 1, requiring the States to secure the Convention rights. This is repeatedly referred to 
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in the thesis. The States have the primary responsibility regarding the effectiveness, whereas 
the Court functions in a supervisory role according to the principle of subsidiarity.  
The goal of ensuring the most effective protection of the rights of individuals is pursued by 
the Court through its evolutive method. A central principle of the ECHR is the Convention 
as ‘a living instrument’ that has to be interpreted in ‘an evolutive and dynamic manner’.150 
The principle of living instrument is based on the tenet of ‘European consensus’, which in 
turn, can be seen as anchored to the reality of the Member States of the Council of Europe, 
in which it applies and reflects the level of uniformity present in their legal frameworks. 
There is a requirement of legitimacy for the conclusions due to the consensual nature of the 
human rights protection system established by the Convention. This system needs a constant 
validation of the direction in which it develops.151 
The interpretative principles also include the principle that the Convention should be 
interpreted in line with its underlying values in so-called meta-teleological interpretation. 
This takes into account the ‘object and purpose’ of the Convention, which is found not only 
in the specific Articles, but in the Convention as a whole, including its Preamble and 
additional Protocols. These elements can confirm the meaning drawn from the literal 
interpretation or, alternatively, disqualify it where another meaning is preferable.152  
Finally, there is the principle of autonomous interpretation.153 The legal terminology of the 
ECHR has a meaning that is independent from, or not necessarily consistent with, the 
meaning of similar or identical terms in the legal systems of the States.154 By this approach 
the Court prevents the States from ‘escaping’ from their obligation to comply with the  
provisions of the Convention by resorting to their national legal classifications.155  
All these principles have significance for the S.S. case, in which the Court applies the 
Convention to novel circumstances. They will arise at various points in the following 
sections: in the penultimate Chapter V, I will return to the alleged violations of Articles 2 
and 3, having studied the question of jurisdiction of Article 1 in the following Chapter IV.   
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IV. Jurisdiction 
1. Generally of Jurisdiction 
The jurisdiction of the Court, as stated in Article 32 ECHR, extends to ‘all matters 
concerning the interpretation and application of the Convention and the Protocols thereto’. 
The Court has thus jurisdiction to decide complaints, or applications, submitted by 
individuals – notably also by persons who are not citizens of any State party.156 What is of 
central interest of this thesis is the question of the reach of the jurisdiction of the State parties 
– in the case at hand, that of Italy. As the respondent, Italy can contest the jurisdiction of the 
Court, and it certainly disputes its own alleged jurisdiction. I will approach my first research 
question by explaining the concept of state jurisdiction, limiting the study within the human 
rights regime, and focusing on my main issue of extraterritorial jurisdiction. 
A fundamental principle of public international law is that of sovereign equality dictating 
that assertions of jurisdiction have to be balanced with the sovereign rights of other states. 
Because territory is inextricably linked to sovereignty, jurisdiction in international law is 
primarily territorial157 and the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction is considered an 
exception. This can be expressed by the presumption of jurisdiction over people situated on 
the official territory of the state party that stems from the division of labour between 
territorial states, a presumption that has to be rebuttable.158 Strictly speaking, however, it can 
be argued that there is no ‘territorial jurisdiction’ per se;159 rather, title and sovereignty 
establish the state’s right to exercise such authority within a specific territory.160  
In human rights, jurisdiction is above all a normative relationship between individual 
subjects as the right-holders and authorities, or institutions, as the duty-bearers. Without state 
jurisdiction over certain people, those people do not have human rights against that state and 
that state has no human rights duties towards those people. Jurisdiction requires both the 
normative condition (the recognition of human rights) and the practical condition 
(feasibleness of the corresponding duties).161 Human rights accentuate the legitimate 
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collective interests they seek to protect and challenge the reciprocal system of traditional 
public international law in the context of extraterritorial human rights breaches.162 
The jurisdiction of Article 1 ECHR is ‘a threshold criterion’: a condition necessary for a 
Contracting State to be held liable for acts and omissions under the Convention.163 It reflects 
the aforementioned concept of jurisdiction of public international law164 and is ‘closely 
linked to that of the international responsibility of the State concerned’.165 The notion of 
jurisdiction in Article 1 ECHR applies to States as the duty-bearers.166  
Although there are different views, today it is commonly held that the obligations ensuing 
to the State may be proportionate to the level of control applied and be ‘divided and tailored’ 
in the specific case, but not jurisdiction per se: either there is a jurisdictional link between 
the State and the person concerned or there is not.167 Hence, in the S.S. case as well, the 
critical question concerns whether this link exists between Italy and the applicants, or not. 
According to the Article 1 ECHR, the Convention Parties must provide protection ‘to 
everyone within their jurisdiction’, thus extending the protection beyond the geographical 
territory of the State to such settings as a temporarily leased or occupied territory, or to 
situations in which the State is engaged in activities inside another state.168 An important 
limitation, expressed in the Soering v. the United Kingdom judgment, is that ‘the Convention 
does not govern the actions of States not Parties to it, nor does it purport to be a means of 
requiring the Contracting States to impose Convention standards on other States’.169 In S.S., 
this obviously means that Libya cannot be held liable under the ECHR. 
In the words of the Guide on Article 1 of the ECHR,170 Article 1 of the Convention ‘must be 
considered to reflect the ordinary and essentially territorial notion of jurisdiction’ – the 
presumption of jurisdiction – ‘other bases of jurisdiction requiring special justification in the 
particular circumstances of each case’.171 Thus, outside the domestic territory and outside 
the cases of lawful territorial control beyond the State’s borders, jurisdiction has to be 
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established in each concrete case by reference to its circumstances.172 The Court has stressed 
this factual appraisal in the detection of jurisdiction, which must be determined ‘with 
reference to the particular facts’.173 I assume that this approach is inevitable in S.S. 
2. The Traditional Categories of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction 
In S.S. the Court could draw on various strands of its case law in order to enable it to find 
that Italy exercised jurisdiction.174 To start with, in the Banković judgment,175 the Court has 
invoked the traditional bases for extraterritorial jurisdiction in international law and 
identified four categories of exceptions to the rule of territoriality by classifying previous 
exceptions articulated in the Court’s case law. Although in Banković the Court specified 
these in comprehensive manner for the first time, it essentially reaffirmed and refined the 
categories set out in the earlier Loizidou decision176 – emphasizing that they should remain 
as exceptional.177   
In the Loizidou case, the central issue was whether Turkey as a Contracting State to the 
ECHR had jurisdiction in the Northern part of Cyprus because of the existence of the Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). Following the process of Turkish occupation of 
Northern Cyprus, Titina Loizidou had been deprived of her right to ‘peacefully enjoy her 
property’, which the TRNC had then confiscated. Turkey recognized the TRNC as an 
independent state, which was not a party to the ECHR and could therefore legally confiscate 
the property, whereas the UN Security Council refused the recognition.  
In Loizidou, the court was faced with two separate but interconnected preliminary questions: 
(1) Whether the wrongful conduct at issue was attributable to its actual perpetrator, the 
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) or to the state that exercises effective control 
over the TRNC, i.e. Turkey; and (2) if, because Turkey was a signatory party to the ECHR 
and the TRNC, being a non-state entity, was not, the Court was competent to examine the 
case on its merits. The first question of attribution was condition for the second question 
concerning the Court’s jurisdiction.178  
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However, it is important to note that whether all of the acts of the TRNC were attributable 
to Turkey was not the crucial issue. Instead, the Court established that Turkey, by virtue of 
its ‘effective overall control’ over Northern Cyprus, had the positive obligation to prevent 
human rights violations, regardless of by whom they were committed.179 So, even though 
the Court used the language of principles of State responsibility and attribution of public 
international law, it still adjudicated along the autonomous concept of jurisdiction of the 
ECHR. Despite, or because of, this ambivalent attitude to the concept of attribution, some 
writers have proposed that Italy’s responsibility in S.S. could be constructed using the 
articles International Law Commission’s (ILC) Articles on State Responsibility (ASR) that 
pertain to aid and attribution. I will return to this briefly at the end of this Chapter (p. 45).  
The Banković case concerned the bombing by the NATO of the Radio Televizije Srbije 
headquarters (RTS) in Belgrade as part of campaign of air strikes against the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) during the Kosovo conflict. When a RTS building was hit by 
a missile launched from a NATO aircraft, 16 people were killed, including Ksenija Banković. 
The case was brought against Member States of NATO, which are also Contracting States 
to the ECHR, and could thus have jurisdiction.  
The four categories of extraterritorial jurisdiction established in Banković are (1) Extradition 
or expulsion cases,180 which involve the extradition or expulsion of an individual from a 
Member State’s territory, giving rise to concerns about possible mistreatment or death in the 
receiving country under Article 2 or 3 or, in extreme cases, the conditions of detention or 
trial under Article 5 or 6; (2) Extraterritorial effects cases,181 in which the acts of State 
authorities produced effects or were performed outside their own territory; (3) Effective 
control cases,182 in which, as a consequence of a lawful or an unlawful military action a 
State exercised effective control of an area outside its national territory; and (4) Consular or 
diplomatic cases and flag jurisdiction cases183 involving the activities of State’s diplomatic 
or consular agents abroad and on board craft and vessels registered in, or flying the flag of, 
that state. 
 
179 Milanovic 2011, p 47 
180 Banković and Others v. Belgium and Others 2001, para. 68 
181 Ibid., para. 69 
182 Ibid., para. 70 
183 Ibid., para. 73 
 31 
3. The Traditional Categories Applied to the S.S. Case 
I approach the question of jurisdiction in the S.S. case firstly by looking at the alternative 
categories elaborated in the Banković judgment. The Application states that ‘Relying on 
Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention, read in conjunction with Article 1 of the Convention, the 
applicants complained that the Rome MRCC, by allowing Ras Jadir to take part in the rescue 
operations, had exposed them at risk of ill-treatment and at risk of death’.184 Apparently, 
Italy’s involvement consists of (i) the presence of an Italian navy helicopter, (ii) partly 
coordinating the intervention through the MRCC, and (iii) the equipping, funding and 
training of the LYCG, perhaps especially the donation of the vessel Ras Jadir.185  
The flag jurisdiction (4) cannot be applied in S.S., as Ras Jadir was flying the Libyan flag. 
Rather, the presumption of Libya’s jurisdiction186 – based on the very rule of flag jurisdiction 
– has to be overturned or at least complemented by Italy’s jurisdiction. Neither does the 
category of extradition (1) seem suitable, because the applicants were not extradited from 
Italy’s territory. Instead, it can be argued that Italy both caused ‘extraterritorial effects’ and 
professed ‘effective control’ (2, 3). 
The (i) role of the Italian military helicopter seems rather minor. It certainly does not belong 
to the category of extraterritorial effects, and it is also unlikely that its presence would 
amount to such ‘full and exclusive control’ as that of the boats in Medvedyev (see below) or 
Hirsi Jamaa. Based on the evidence provided by the reconstruction of the events, the 
helicopter apparently did not make physical contact with the migrants or their boat. The crew 
of the helicopter asked repeatedly Ras Jadir to stop when the vessel sped from the scene with 
a person hanging dangerously from its side. It appears that the crew of Ras Jadir deliberately 
ignored the communication.  
As to the (ii) coordinating the intervention, the Court could probably conceive of the Rome-
based MRCC’s instructions as an act of the Italian State taking place on Italian territory, 
which had ‘extraterritorial effects’ on the migrant boat that was at the high sea and outside 
of the Italian territorial waters. For this, a sufficiently close causal link between the 
instructions and the rights violations would have to be established. Italy would likely argue 
that instead of instructing the LYCG to mistreat the migrants or expose them to a risk of ill-
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treatment in Libya, it only instructed Ras Jadir to rescue them.187 It is also unclear what the 
exact orders were. From the reconstruction it appears that MRCC Rome had communicated 
by phone with the LYCG Joint Operation Room (JOR) in Tripoli and asked the official in 
charge to assume the On Scene Coordinator (OSC) role, which the official had accepted and 
confirmed.188 
What might back up this argument is the premature transfer of the Maritime Coordination 
and Rescue Center responsibilities to Libya as explained in Chapter II. The Commissioner 
for Human Rights of the Council of Europe has recommended that the Member States should 
only transfer coordination to the RCC responsible for the Search and Rescue Region if that 
RCC is able to fully meet its obligations under international maritime law and human rights 
law, including with regard to safe disembarkation.189 As reported above, the Libyan 
authorities unilaterally declared the Libyan SAR zone, and the Libyan Maritime Rescue 
Coordination Center, although not fully operational, together with the LYCG became the 
primary actors. And even in cases of joint operations, the MRCC of the Member State retains 
fully its own responsibility for the preservation of life at sea and the respect of the non-
refoulement obligation.190 The Commissioner has also urged that the coordinating 
authorities should ensure instructions given in the course of rescue operations fully respect 
the human rights of rescued migrants, including by preventing them from being put in 
situations where their right to life would be threatened, or where they would be subjected to 
torture, inhuman or degrading treatment, or to arbitrary deprivation of liberty.191 
The transfer of the MRCC responsibilities can also be seen as a part of the larger scheme of 
the EU and Italy building up Libya’s capacities of external border control. Thus, the most 
interesting question regarding jurisdiction probably concerns the role of the systematic 
funding and training by Italy (iii), which could be argued to amount to overall ‘effective 
control’.  
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4. The Test of Effective Control and the Criticism of Banković 
Various international courts have developed and applied their ‘tests’ in order to establish 
whether a secessionist entity has been under ‘effective control’, ‘overall control’ or 
‘effective overall control’ of an outside power.192 Before the ECtHR, the International Court 
of Justice (ICJ) formulated its two-part test in Nicaragua v. United States of America.193 The 
ICJ’s first assessment of complete dependence or control194 gauges generally whether the 
relationship between a state and non-state actor is so much of control on the one side and 
dependence on the other that the non-state actor has to be equated for legal purposes with an 
organ of the state. The second test of effective control195 is applied only when the first test is 
not satisfied: it asks whether a specific operation of a non-state actor which is neither a de 
jure nor a de facto organ of the state was indeed conducted under the state’s control.196  
The ECtHR developed its own test of ‘effective control’ in Loizidou in order to find out 
whether a ‘subordinate local administration’197 is an entity under ‘the effective authority, or 
at the very least under the decisive influence, of’ an outside power, and ‘in any event survives 
by virtue of the military, economic, financial and political support given to it’198 by the 
outside power.199 Even if the Court did not adjudicate based on the attribution doctrine, it 
linked the effective control to attribution as the condition for establishing jurisdiction.200 
Here, the Court resorted to the theory of de facto organ, under which conduct is not attributed 
to its actual wrongdoer, but rather to the state that exercises effective control over the 
wrongdoer.201 And in Banković, the Court reasoned that the State’s responsibility cannot be 
confined to the acts of its own agents but is also engaged by the acts of such local 
administration that survives by virtue of the State’s support.202 
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According to the Guide on Article 1 of the ECHR,203 ‘the question whether a Contracting 
State is genuinely exercising effective control over a territory outside its borders is one of 
fact’ regarding primarily two criteria: (i) the number of soldiers deployed by the State in the 
territory in question:204 (ii) the extent to which the State’s military, economic and political 
support for the local subordinate administration provides it with influence and control over 
the region.205 Obviously, the first – and more often invoked criterium by the Court –, is not 
applicable in the S.S. case, as there is no question of Italian soldiers deployed in the Libyan 
territory or at the high sea. Therefore, there remains the alternative of military, economic 
and political support.  
The categories of extraterritorial jurisdiction remain the clearest articulation of the 
exceptional ambit of the State’s jurisdiction.206 However, the argumentation of the Court in 
Banković has raised a lot of criticism. Although it is undisputed, and presumed, that the 
jurisdictional competence of states is primarily territorial, it is questionable whether 
territoriality constitutes, in the first place, the essence of the concept of jurisdiction in Article 
1 ECHR.207 The main weakness of the Court’s argumentation in Banković, based on state 
practice and the travaux préparatoires of the ECHR, is to interpret jurisdiction in the sense 
of public international law, restrictively and without taking sufficiently into account the 
object and purpose of Article 1.208 The Court determined that jurisdiction could only apply 
extraterritorially when the state exercises ‘public powers’, disregarding the evidentiary and 
procedural/substantive law distinctions determined in Loizidou.209 The judgment seems to 
cause confusion by somewhat tautologically stating that only extraterritorial acts which 
‘constitute an exercise of jurisdiction’ can engage the protection of the ECHR; in other words 
that it is the nature of the act that is decisive in establishing the jurisdictional link.210  
It can be argued that in Banković, the Court likened the term jurisdiction to the concept of 
legal title under international law and by doing so conflated jurisdiction under Article 1 
ECHR with the prerogative of the state to act – which a contrario would lead to the absurdity 
that states operating abroad without legal title conferred by international law can also be 
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human rights exempt.211 The outcome of the judgment, that the Contracting States to the 
ECHR were free from the responsibility of the bombing because they acted under NATO, 
has been described as unfortunate and even catastrophic.  
Several recent cases undermine Banković’s central proposition – that jurisdiction is primarily 
territorial – in favour of initially more expansive interpretations.212 Partly the Court has 
returned to the doctrine present in Loizidou, and partly readjusted its reasoning in line with 
the principles of the ECHR being ‘a living instrument’ that has to be interpreted in ‘an 
evolutive and dynamic manner. The subsequent case law proves that the Court is willing to 
accept that the notion of jurisdiction need not necessarily preclude a conclusion that positive 
obligations not accompanied by the exercise of ‘effective control’ over persons abroad can 
nonetheless bring those persons within the jurisdiction of the State.213 
5. The S.S. in the Light of Later Case Law 
In Al-Skeini the Court declared that through its ‘consent, acquiescence, or invitation of the 
territorial sovereign, a State may also exercise de jure jurisdiction not only within its own 
national waters or on the high seas, but also in the territorial sea of a third country’.214 Al-
Skeini concerned the killing of Iraqi civilians by British soldiers in southern Iraq. Based on 
the fact that the United Kingdom (UK) had assumed responsibility for the maintenance of 
security in Southern Iraq, the question was whether the UK was exercising ‘control and 
authority’ over Iraqi civilians and whether the UK Government therefore had a duty to 
conduct an effective investigation into the deaths of the civilians killed by British soldiers, 
whether or not they were within the confines of a UK military base. One of the victims was 
killed by a stray bullet resulting from an exchange of fire in which British troops were 
engaged. Although it could not be established which side fired the bullet, the Court found 
that since that death, too, occurred in the course of the UK security operation, when British 
soldiers carried out a patrol in the vicinity of the applicant’s home and joined in the fatal 
exchange of fire, there was a jurisdictional link between the UK and the victim.215 
The Court identified and elaborated in Al-Skeini three constitutive elements of jurisdiction: 
effective power, overall control and normative guidance. The element of (i) effective power 
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was already articulated in Loizidou, when the Court stated that ‘the responsibility of 
Contracting Parties can be involved because of acts of their authorities, whether performed 
within or outside national boundaries, which produce effects outside their own territory’.216 
This led to the ‘effective control of an area’ jurisdiction. The element of (ii) ‘overall’ control, 
confirmed by Banković, was corroborated by Al-Skeini. It emanates from exercising ‘all or 
some of the public powers normally to be exercised’ by that the local government, which 
excludes instantaneous and singular exercises of power.217 The (iii) normative–guidance 
element of authority is described in Al-Skeini followingly: ‘In particular, the United 
Kingdom assumed authority and responsibility for the maintenance of security in south-east 
Iraq […] exercised authority and control over individuals killed in the course of such security 
operations, so as to establish a jurisdictional link between the deceased and the United 
Kingdom’.218 – It is widely held that the Court adjusted its line of interpretation in Al-Skeini 
by correcting the departure from Loizidou that it had made in Banković. 
As under public international law, not only de jure but also de facto control is relevant in the 
determination of legal responsibility. The three constitutive elements identified in Al-Skeini 
seem to reflect the interplay of de jure and de facto control. In the realm of human rights law 
jurisdiction is pronouncedly a question of whether de facto power gives rise to an obligation 
vis-à-vis a specific territory or individual.219 It can be said that in the presence of de facto 
control, no de jure basis is normally needed to trigger Article 1 ECHR; respectively, in the 
presence of de jure jurisdiction, no particular amount of de facto power is required, but the 
‘threshold condition’ is met through even a minimal de jure jurisdictional link.220 In a sense, 
it can also be formulated so that ‘overall control’ is the de facto counterpart of the de jure 
title entailed by the (territorial) state sovereignty.221  
In Medvedyev and Others v. France, the Court considered that France exercised ‘full and 
exclusive control’ over the Cambodian vessel Winner, without boarding it, and over its crew 
at least de facto in a continuous and uninterrupted manner so that until the applicants were 
tried in France, they were effectively within France’s jurisdiction for the purposes of Article 
1 of the Convention.222 Like that of Al-Skeini, the outcome is in contrast to the Banković 
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decision. The vessel was interdicted due to a suspicion of drug smuggling, and the crew were 
convicted in France. They brought proceedings before the ECtHR challenging the legality 
of their detention at sea and the delay in bringing them before a court under Articles 5(1) 
and (3) ECHR. The Court found a violation of Article 5(1) that secures the right to liberty 
and security of person.  
That direct physical contact is not necessary as long as the control thereby exerted is effective 
was shown also in the Women on Waves v. Portugal case, in which a Portuguese military 
ship blockaded the access of a Dutch vessel Borndiep to Portugal’s territorial waters.223 
Three associations had sent Borndiep to Portugal, where abortion was illegal, in order to 
stage activities promoting the decriminalization of abortion. Borndiep did not fly the 
Portuguese flag, was outside Portuguese territorial waters, and the associations were not 
Portuguese, but the Court assumed jurisdiction, and found a violation of Article 10 (freedom 
of expression), but not of the alleged violation of Article 11 (freedom of assembly). 
In Hirsi Jamaa, the Court opined that ‘the applicants were under the continuous and exclusive 
de jure and de facto control of the Italian authorities’.224 The Court acknowledged the 
application of the Convention when the alleged violation took place on board military ships 
flying the Italian flag, observing that ‘by virtue of the relevant provisions of the law of the sea, 
a vessel sailing on the high seas is subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the State of the flag 
it is flying’225 and that ‘the events took place entirely on board ships of the Italian armed forces, 
the crews of which were composed exclusively of Italian military personnel’.226 That Italy 
could not avoid jurisdiction under the Convention is an application of the general rule of public 
international law that States exercise jurisdiction over vessels sailing on the high seas flying 
their flag.227 Customary international law recognizes the validity of the exercise of universal 
jurisdiction on board such vessels, both ships and aircraft.228 The special nature of the maritime 
environment could not exclude Italy’s jurisdiction.229 
In the case of Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia, together with the other litigants Ilie 
Ilaşcu argued that the Moldovan authorities were responsible for the alleged infringements 
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of the rights secured to them, since they had not taken any appropriate steps to put an end to 
them, and that the Russian Federation shared responsibility since the territory of 
Transdniestria was and is under de facto Russian control on account of the Russian troops 
and military equipment stationed there and the support allegedly given to the separatist 
regime by the Russian Federation. The Court held that the Transdniestrian region in question 
remained under Russia’s effective authority or at least under its decisive influence, and at 
any event the Moldovan Republic of Transdniestria (MRT) survived due to the military, 
economic, financial and political support provided by Russia, so that the applicants were 
within the ‘jurisdiction’ of Russia.230  
The Court reached the conclusion on account of persisting military influence of the Russian 
forces in the area, the fact that the Russian Federation enabled the MRT to acquire the 
infrastructure and weapons belonging to the Russian armed forces, and various examples of 
Russian economic support given to the breakaway region.231 As to the jurisdiction of 
Moldova, it was also established – although disputed in dissenting opinions – but is left out 
of the scope of this study, as it is of territorial nature. 
The outcome of Ilaşcu is not unproblematic, though. If the Court is interpreted to hold that 
the actions of the MRT were at all times attributable to Russia, it is clear that Russia had 
jurisdiction and control over the territory of Transdniestria. However, if the acts of the MRT 
were not generally attributable to Russia, but Russia was being held responsible for its failure 
to comply with its positive obligations, the standard of ‘decisive influence’ is set much lower 
than the requirement of exercise of public powers or a de facto government or administration 
of the territory in the previous cases of Loizidou, Bankovic or Al-Skeini.  
In a Dissenting Opinion, Judge A. Kovler argues that the Court should declare the application 
inadmissible both ratione loci and ratione personae as regards Russia. The alleged military 
actions by Russia did not amount to the standard set by Loizidou (occupation through 
targeted military action of the territory of the other State), and even if they were, the Court 
proceeded in wrong order by holding that there was Russia’s jurisdiction because there was 
responsibility (‘While the responsibility of a Contracting Party may be engaged as a 
consequence of military action outside its territory, this does not imply exercise of its 
jurisdiction’).232 According to Kovler, there was no military invasion from outside, because 
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the Russian troops (who had only just ceased to be Soviet troops)233 were ‘caught out’ by 
events in the place where they had been stationed for many years without interfering in 
administrative matters nor engaging in any ‘active duties’.234 
The permissive approach that the majority took regarding Russia’s jurisdiction can be 
justified, on one hand, by referring to Russia’s involvement in the initial creation of the 
MRT. On the other hand, Russia’s potential for effective overall control can be emphasized: 
a power that remained and meant that Russia could be said to exercise effective overall 
control over Transdniestria, because if it wanted to it could easily make its power felt more 
overtly.235  
The ECtHR has followed these lines of reasoning in Transdniestria cases,236 and in its very 
recent judgment Georgia v. Russia the Court referred to both Loizidou and Ilaşcu. The Court 
reiterated that ‘the question whether or not a Contracting State exercises effective control 
over an area outside its own territory is a question of fact’, and held relevant such indicators 
as ‘the extent to which [the State’s] military, economic and political support for the local 
subordinate administration provides it with influence and control over the region’.237  
This might offer a plausible way to find Italy’s jurisdiction in S.S. It can be argued that the 
funds, training, and capacity-building activities delivered to Libya are for the explicit 
purpose of ‘significantly reducing migratory flows’ and ‘preventing departures’. Reflecting 
on Ilaşcu and the other Transdniestria cases, the Court could argue that there is ‘a continuous 
and uninterrupted link of responsibility’, holding that the Libyan state organ of LYCG is 
analogical to the self-proclaimed republic of the MRT.238 Similarly to Ilaşcu, the role of Italy 
in creating or building up LYCG as well as the ‘potential’ of Italy could be emphasised.  
The Ilaşcu decision seems additionally to confirm that jurisdiction is a flexible concept and 
that depending on the extent of State control, the person can be within the jurisdiction to a 
certain extent, but not necessarily with regard to all Convention rights and full scale of state 
human rights obligations.239 Thus, the applicants need not to be under continuous or 
exclusive control – an interpretation which is broader or more permissive than the 
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aforementioned dichotomy of Al-Skeini that either there is a jurisdictional link or there is 
not. In the Transdniestria cases the jurisdiction is ‘shared’, which must influence how much 
effective control either of the two States on has in practice over the persons of the rights-
holders. This is the case even if the jurisdiction is presumed (as Moldova’s is), because that 
presumption may be rebutted in practice.240  
Jurisdiction in the sense of Article 1 ECHR cannot be shared between Italy and Libya, 
because the latter is not party to the Convention. Italy does not need to be the active party, 
though, as according to the Guide on Article 1 of the ECHR the Contracting State’s 
responsibility may be also engaged by the acquiescence or connivance of the State’s 
authorities in the acts of private individuals which violate the Convention rights of other 
individuals within its jurisdiction.241 This is an important issue, as the alleged violations of 
Italy concern its positive obligations (see more below in Chapter V).  
6. A Recourse to the UN Human Rights Committee 
Although the Court mainly refers to its own case law in its argumentation, the applicability 
of the jurisprudence of other international authorities in relation to Member States is not 
excluded.242 As external sources count not only such provisions of international law as 
mentioned in Chapter III, but also judgments of other international and regional tribunals. 
The Human Rights Committee that monitors implementation of the ICCPR has also 
competence to examine individual complaints with regard to alleged violations of the 
Covenant by States parties to the First Optional Protocol.243 Although the Committee is not 
a Court proper in the sense that the ECtHR is, it deals with similar human rights issues, and 
it seems relevant and justifiable to include its case law in the thesis.  
The Committee holds that a State party may be responsible for extraterritorial violations of 
the Covenant, if the State is a link in the causal chain that would make possible violations 
on the territory of another State. The risk of an extra-territorial violation must be a necessary 
and foreseeable consequence of the State’s actions or omissions, which must be judged on 
the knowledge the State had at the time.244 
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It has been suggested that the UN Human Rights Committee has both expressed and applied 
a concept of ‘functional jurisdiction’.245 This can be described as an ‘impact model’, in 
which sufficiently proximate and foreseeable impact is constitutive of jurisdiction for the 
purpose of the extraterritorial application of the ICCPR. General Comment 36 on Article 6 
of the ICCPR requires the States to ensure that all activities taking place not only within 
their territory, but also ‘in other places subject to their jurisdiction’ that have ‘a direct and 
reasonably foreseeable impact on the right to life of individuals outside their territory’, are 
consistent with Article 6.246 What is of importance for the S.S. case is that within the State’s 
jurisdiction are even ‘persons located outside any territory effectively controlled by the State, 
whose right to life is nonetheless impacted by its military or other activities in a direct and 
reasonably foreseeable manner’, and that ‘States also have obligations under international 
law not to aid or assist activities undertaken by other States and non-State actors’.247 
Article 6 on the right to life is parallel to Article 2 of the ECHR. For the S.S. case, the analogy 
can therefore be seen as limited to the alleged violations of that Article only. The reach of 
jurisdiction can, in my opinion, yet be studied analogically and independently of the material 
Articles. The Committee has applied its concept of jurisdiction in two recent cases very 
similar to S.S., which are brought against Malta and Italy and concern the States’ failure to 
rescue a group of more than 200 migrants whose vessel sank in the Mediterranean in 2013.248 
In the case against Italy, the authors claim that the Italian and Maltese rescue centres passed 
responsibility for the rescue operation to one another instead of intervening promptly249 – 
resembling the lack of clear command between the Rome MRCC and LYCG in S.S. The 
Committee notes that it is undisputed that the shipwreck occurred outside the State party’s 
territory, as it did in S.S., and that none of the alleged violations occurred on board a vessel 
flying an Italian flag.250 However, according to the Committee, ‘in the particular 
circumstances of the case, a special relationship of dependency had been established 
between the individuals on the vessel in distress and Italy’. This relationship consists of 
several factual elements. These include (i) the initial contact made by the vessel in distress 
with the MRCC, (ii) the close proximity of an Italian ship ITS Libra to the vessel and  
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(iii) the ongoing involvement of the MRCC in the rescue operation. The legal obligations, 
in turn, are stipulated by the international law of the sea, and include the duty to respond in 
a reasonable manner to calls of distress pursuant to SOLAS Regulations and to appropriately 
cooperate with other states undertaking rescue operations pursuant to the International 
Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue.251  
Echoing its General Comment 36, the Committee considered that the victims were directly 
affected by the decisions taken by the Italian authorities in a manner that was reasonably 
foreseeable in light of the relevant legal obligations of Italy. The fact that they were within 
the Maltese SAR region does not exclude Italy’s jurisdiction, but posits them concurrently 
within the jurisdiction of Malta.252 As to the responsibility, the question was of omission: if 
Italian authorities had directed ITS Libra and other coast guard boats earlier to the rescue, 
they would have reached the vessel before it sank.253 
To make matters more complicated, the jurisdiction of Italy is refuted in a dissenting opinion 
– as it was in the ECtHR case of Ilaşcu. The accident is described as a situation in which 
States have only ‘potential to place under their effective control individuals who are found 
outside their territory or areas already subject to their effective control’ as distinguished from 
a situation in which the individuals are actually placed under effective control.254 The 
dissenting opinion argues that mere potentiality never establishes jurisdiction – which equals 
mutatis mutandis the refuting of Russia’s potential for control in the dissenting opinion in 
Ilaşcu. In the Committee case, the dissenting opinion also repudiates the sufficiency of the 
facts ‘in the absence of additional information showing acceptance of legal responsibility’, 
questioning what the majority holds for the legal obligations incurred by the SOLAS and 
SAR Convention.255 The dissenting opinion concludes that Malta alone, and not Italy, was 
responsible de jure or de facto for the overall conduct of the operation.256 
The ‘impact model’ is invoked in another recent Committee case that is even more similar 
to S.S. than the one above. Like S.S., the case of SDG is also on the communication stage.257 
In an alleged refoulement operation 7.–8.11.2018, the Rome MRCC directed a private 
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merchant vessel to rescue a migrant boat adrift on the high seas in the Mediterranean and to 
liaise with the LYCG, resulting in the forceful return of migrants to Libya. The Italian 
MRCC was de facto acting as coordinator of the SAR operation knew or should have known 
this outcome.258 It is argued that the Italian Coast Guard communicated ‘on behalf of the 
LYCG’, which then assumed coordination and communicated with the merchant vessel from 
the Libyan Naval Coordination Centre (LNCC) held on board an Italian Navy ship docked 
in Tripoli harbour, deployed in Libya as part of the Italian Navy Operation Nauras.259 
Although the victim SDG was located outside of any territory effectively controlled by Italy, 
his rights were decisively impacted by the activities of Italian authorities in a direct and 
foreseeable manner.260 The jurisdiction is ‘functional’ in the sense of being constituted of 
various factors (rather than presumed by territory, for instance). 
7. The Concept of Functional Jurisdiction Applied to S.S. 
In a concurring opinion to Al-Skeini, judge Bonello outlined the ‘functional’ jurisdiction for 
the purposes of the ECtHR. Instead of applying ‘an obvious functional test’, the Court has 
adopted ‘a handful of sub-tests, some of which may have served defilers of Convention 
values far better than they have the Convention itself’.261 In Bonello’s words, jurisdiction 
means ‘no less and no more than “authority over” and “control of”’, and it ‘ought to be 
functional’.262 Therefore, the only ‘honest test’ should ask whether it depended on the agents 
of the State whether the alleged violation would be committed or not.263 
In a recent article Violeta Moreno-Lax studies the S.S. case, which ‘offers a paradigmatic 
example of the kind of policy and operational control that portrays the functional approach 
to jurisdiction’.264 With the concept of functional jurisdiction, the territorial/extraterritorial 
dyad could be avoided altogether by focusing on the ‘normative foundation of sovereign 
authority overall’.265 According to Moreno-Lax, the evaluation of jurisdiction in a concrete 
situation requires that attention be paid to ‘the entire constellation of all the relevant channels 
through which factual and/or legal state functions are exercised’. Italy’s actions and those of 
Libya that it instructed should be seen as a whole, creating ‘a system of contactless, yet 
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effective, control of the SAR and interdiction functions of Libya that amounts to an exercise 
of functional jurisdiction’.266 The applicants need not have been directly affected or placed 
under the effective control of Italy, but ‘the relationship of the situation with a particular set 
of circumstances of a special nature’ is decisive in enlivening Italy’s positive obligations.267  
In both the Committee’s General Comment 36 and the case involving the Italian ship ITS 
Libra there is the condition of ‘direct impact’, whereas in the later SDG application the 
wording is ‘decisive impact’. The ‘functional jurisdiction’ invoked by Moreno-Lax for the 
S.S. seems to be congruent with this permissive version of ‘impact model’ of jurisdiction.  
The available case law is scant and there is no well-elaborated doctrine of functional 
jurisdiction yet. On the other hand, the concept of functional jurisdiction and the ‘normative 
foundation of sovereign authority overall’ proposed by Moreno-Lax seems to reflect the 
three constitutive elements of jurisdiction already pointed out in Al-Skeini: effective power, 
overall control and normative guidance. The ‘decisive impact’ cannot be too far, either, from 
the ‘decisive influence’ of Ilaşcu. The criterion for the ECHR to apply has never been 
essentially territorial, as mentioned, but pertained precisely to the ‘function’ of jurisdiction, 
which has territorial, temporal, and personal ‘dimensions’ (or ‘consequences’ of jurisdiction).  
In noble terms, the functional approach to jurisdiction that Bonello and Moreno-Lax take can 
be seen as a testimony to the core idea of human rights that emerged after the Second World 
War: the securing of a political membership and hence the position in a political community 
that guarantees a minimal level of protection of international human rights.268 
8. From Jurisdiction to Responsibility for Positive Obligations 
As it has become clear, to adjudicate in the unprecedented extraterritorial and ‘indirect’ or 
‘contactless’ issue of S.S., the Court must study the particular circumstances of the case and 
proceed with reference to particular facts. It has to take into account both the role that Italy 
played in the incident itself – the instructions by the Rome MRCC or the lack thereof – and 
the multiform support and coordination resulting from the MoU. Unlike in Hirsi Jamaa, the 
pull-back operation in S.S. was carried out by Libya, and unlike Al-Skeini or Ilaşcu, where 
there were the troops of an ECHR Member States present, in S.S. there were no Italian 
authorities on scene. Besides the factual links, the Court needs to establish a sufficient legal 
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nexus – de jure jurisdiction, or normative element – between Italy and the applicants. Italy 
cannot probably incur responsibility for its actions, but only for its omissions, which leads 
to the doctrine of positive obligations. Before moving on to Chapter V, I cast a brief look at 
the junction of the jurisdiction and the responsibility of the State.  
I have proceeded assuming, firstly, that there is a clear enough separation between the 
question of the respondent State’s jurisdiction and the question of its responsibility.269 
Secondly, I have learnt to understand that the jurisdiction as a specific rule of the ECtHR is 
an autonomous concept, which does not refer to the principles of State responsibility in 
international law, and to which the question whether extra-territorial acts are attributable to 
the State is irrelevant.270 Thus, it should not be relevant whether the State has legal title to 
act but whether there pre-exists a link or nexus between the individual affected and the State 
to secure that individual’s rights.271 
However, the Court has the option to consider admissibility and merits concurrently, having 
to notify the parties if it plans to do this.272 To me, there seems to be an inescapable and to a 
degree perplexing connection between the concepts of, or criteria for, jurisdiction and 
responsibility – a connection, or an overlap, that appears especially acute when the issue 
concerns the positive obligations of the State. For instance, when I read that ‘in the context 
of migration the relatively open nature of the positive obligations can make it difficult to 
identify just what specific conduct of the State will engender the jurisdictional link between 
the State and the individual’,273 I hear the echo of Banković: is it the nature of the act that is 
decisive in establishing the jurisdictional link? And did not the Court ‘proceed in wrong 
order’ in Ilaşcu, if it held that ‘there was jurisdiction because there was responsibility’? 
In recent journal articles on the S.S. case by Annick Pijnenburg274 and Elisa Vari275 the 
authors propose that Italy could incur responsibility under the international state 
responsibility rules because of ‘the extent of the assistance given’.276 The ILC has affirmed 
that Article 16 ASR applies to human rights treaties,277 and the ECtHR has referred to it in 
rendition cases and in a separate opinion in Hirsi Jamaa. So, hypothetically, the notion of 
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‘aid and assistance’ stipulated in Article 16 ASR could ‘flesh out’ the nature of the 
relationship between the act of facilitation and the eventual wrongful act.278 The conditions 
for the responsibility are that the State has knowledge of the circumstances of the 
internationally wrongful act, and it would be wrongful if committed by that State.279  
If the Court followed the reasoning suggested by Pijnenburg, it should start by determining 
that the ill-treatment by the LYCG constitutes an internationally wrongful act as defined by 
Article 2 ASR.280 The Court could read Article 16 ASR into Article 3 ECHR, by interpreting 
the latter as including a prohibition of aiding or assisting another State in breaching the 
prohibition of ill-treatment. If Libya can be said to breach Article 3, and Italy is responsible 
under Article 16 ASR for aiding or assisting the violation, the Court could hold that Italy 
breached its positive obligations under Article 3 ECHR, and the aid and assistance would 
discharge Italy’s jurisdiction.281  
However, as mentioned earlier, the jurisdiction of the Court is limited to the responsibility 
of State Parties under the ECHR, and it should not rule on the lawfulness of activities of 
non-State parties.282 Therefore, not only would the Court be unable to find a violation of the 
ECHR by the non-State party Libya, neither could it determine that the ill-treatment by the 
LYCG constitutes a violation of a provision of another treaty that Libya has ratified – for 
example the Article 7 of the ICCPR – or the jus cogens prohibition of torture.283   
The Court has never applied the Article 16 ASR in practice.284 Instead, it has interpreted 
complicity scenarios in the norms of the ECHR285 and construed inter-state removal and 
indirect refoulement cases as giving rise to the independent responsibility of the States 
without the concepts of reciprocity, attribution or the ‘aid or assistance’ of the Article 16.286 
Neither in the Ilaşcu case did the Court deal with the question of attribution of the conduct 
of the Transdniestrian authorities to the Russian Federation, but seized on the acts committed 
by the Russian themselves, including the applicants’ transfer to the regime where they were 
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ill-treated.287 The jurisdiction requirement as a primary norm obstructs the application of the 
secondary norms on attribution and distributing responsibility such as drafted by the ILC.288  
One of the few human rights aid and assistance cases has been Tugar v. Italy, which 
concerned an Iraqi mine cleaner who stepped on a mine laid by Iraq but illegally sold to the 
Iraqi government by a Italian company. The complaint was phrased in terms of complicity, 
but the European Commission of Human Rights understood it as one relating to a lack of 
protection of right to life and Italy’s positive obligation to protect it, and eventually found 
the complaint inadmissible, because the adverse consequences of the failure of Italy to 
regulate arms transfers to Iraq were too remote.289 The Commission referred to the Soering 
judgment290 and recalled that the ECHR does not govern the actions of States not Parties to 
it, nor does it purport to be a means of requiring the Contracting States to impose Convention 
standards on other States, and attributed the applicant’s injuries exclusively to Iraq.  
In the case of S.S., yet another twist to the question of Italy’s jurisdiction is added by the fact 
that it has been brought only against Italy, although there is a considerable involvement by 
the EU as an international organization in the border control management.291 The EU is 
legally bound to accede to the ECHR, but it has not yet done so. In Al-Jedda v. the United 
Kingdom,292 the Court acknowledges the possibility of the dual attribution of conduct of an 
international organization and a State, which could apply to S.S., too. However, the Court 
would not necessarily need to be burdened with determining the responsibility of the EU, 
because it can be assessed separately.293 Even if Italy was only partially in control, it can yet 
be fully responsible, because each actor’s responsibility is assessed independently – 
corroborated inter alia by Ilaşcu.294 Still, it is important to keep in mind the dissenting 
opinions expressed in Ilaşcu and in the UN Human Rights Committee case against Italy. 
I will now leave the issue of jurisdiction in order to turn to my second research question 
concerning Italy’s responsibility for its positive obligations in the following Chapter V. 
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V. Responsibility  
1. Generally of Positive Obligations 
If the Court finds Italy’s jurisdiction in S.S., it is likely to focus on Italy’s omissions of its 
positive obligations to protect the Convention rights. In this Chapter, I outline the doctrine 
of positive obligations and the various criteria, requirements or ‘tests’ which the Court has 
developed and which it applies. Italy, in its submission, most probably argues that these 
criteria, or some of them, are not fulfilled in S.S.  
At the outset, the obligation to respect human rights has both negative and positive 
dimensions. In a negative sense, States are under an obligation not to violate Articles 2 to 
14, as well as the substantive provisions of the Protocols to the extent these have been 
ratified. The positive dimension means that they must also ensure respect for the Convention 
and the Protocols through, for example, establishing a legal framework for the protection of 
these rights and enforcing measures to ensure its observance.295  
Stated in the Article 1, it is the Court’s fundamental task to effectively protect human rights. 
To do this in the light of present-day conditions by interpreting and applying the Convention, 
the object and purpose of the Convention requires the Court to interpret the Convention so 
as to contain positive obligations.296 
As it has emerged above in the discussion of the norms on attribution and distributing 
responsibility of the ASR, unlike most international treaties the ECHR is not founded on 
reciprocity.297 Thus, instead of requiring the States to comply with the Convention provided 
that and until the other parties do the same, it constitutes an objective human rights legal 
order. Within this order, the breaches of positive obligations – either of result or of conduct 
– take the form of unlawful omission: an action that is required by the Convention was not 
done. Because omissions do not ‘materialise’ and are more difficult to identify than actions, 
it remains often context-dependent whose abstention from what action – which authority 
should have done what – constitutes a violation of a right.298  
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Sometimes the Court has disagreed whether to examine a case from the perspective of 
negative or positive obligations,299 even to the extent of a considerable debate.300 The Court 
is left with some latitude, which can enable it to pre-empt questions of attribution.301 If there 
is misconduct by an officer, the Court can focus either on the action that directly caused the 
alleged harm, or on an omission that made the harmful action possible, i.e. the lack of some 
preventive measure. For example, if a teacher causes bodily harm to a pupil by punishing, 
the Court may find a state responsible for the harm suffered by the pupil irrespective of 
whether the physical misconduct is attributable to the State. This is legally unproblematic, 
because negative and positive state duties as well as active and omissive State conduct can 
co-exist and co-apply.302 
The scope of positive obligations under Article 1 of the Convention rights relates to a content 
of protection that can realistically be secured by the State’s resources. Where the protection 
of a human right cannot be guaranteed, positive obligations may not arise for reasons of 
impracticality. If at least some form of protection is possible – provided that it satisfies the 
minimum level of effectiveness – a positive obligation will arise in relation to that form of 
protection. Thus, although the extent of protection may vary from one context to another and 
with the circumstances of each particular case, it is essential to establish a minimum content 
of protection.303 
Traditionally the Court can be seen as favouring negative over positive obligations by 
constructing the former type as ‘archetypical’ human rights obligations and the latter as more 
exceptional ones. The case of Marckx that is crucial for the development of the doctrine of 
positive obligations has also contributed to their status as something exceptional.304 
Regarding even the ‘absolute’ Article 3, the Court has held that the provision ‘may be 
described in general terms as imposing a primarily negative obligation on States to refrain 
from inflicting serious harm on persons within their jurisdiction’.305 By considering positive 
obligations as something ‘additional’ that ‘may’ be read into the Convention rights, the Court 
has suggested that the existence of such obligations is not taken for granted, but rather is 
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something that must be justified in each particular case.306 This, I think, echoes the emphasis 
on the particular circumstances and facts when deciding on the extraterritorial jurisdiction. 
In addition to reactive responses, practical protection can be defined in the form of 
precautionary measures where contextual knowledge suffices per se to establish the need for 
protection of human rights. Such a content of protection is justified by the principal aim of 
prevention of human rights violations that is central to the nature of positive obligations.307 
The Court’s case law on protective duties in the context of the conduct of a foreign state is 
probably best developed in expulsion and extradition cases.308 In those, however, the 
individuals are at the material time within the State’s territory and therefore indisputably 
within its jurisdiction.309 In the context of extraterritorial migration control of the S.S. case, 
their applicability might therefore be limited.  
In following I aim to present the criteria that the Court applies in order to find out whether 
the State in question could be held responsible for a violation of its positive obligation. Their 
application to the S.S. case I will study in the next Chapter VI. 
2. Reasonable Knowledge 
The Court has developed a ‘reasonable knowledge and means’ test in in relation to the use 
of lethal violence or ill-treatment by third parties and applies it to alleged violations of 
Articles 2 and 3 ECHR.310 In Osman v. the United Kingdom311 the Court evaluated the reach 
and content of protective measures.  
In relation to Article 2, the Court declared that ‘where there is an allegation that the 
authorities have violated their positive obligation to protect the right to life’ by preventing 
and suppressing offences against the person, ‘it must be established to [the Court’s] 
satisfaction that the authorities knew or ought to have known at the time of the existence of 
a real and immediate risk to the life of an identified individual or individuals from the 
criminal acts of a third party and that they failed to take measures within the scope of their 
powers which, judged reasonably, might have been expected to avoid that risk.’312 This so-
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called Osman test can be used as a ‘causal test’ in every context when Article 2 is concerned, 
‘because life is not less valuable in some situations than in others.’313 
When knowledge is established from the presence of a known context of private parties’ 
interaction, then both the source of the threat to human rights and the individuals who are 
likely to be affected can reasonably be identified.314 In other cases, the Court can imply the 
element of knowledge from previous incidents, which was established in the Marckx case.315 
The knowledge can also be implied from the practices of the States, and even those of non-
member states, in which similar human right issues have already been dealt with under a 
proven record of effectiveness.316  
So, for example, in Ilaşcu the agents of the Russian Government knew, or at least should 
have known, the fate which awaited the applicants.317 The Russian Federation was held 
responsible for its omissions, as it made no attempt to put an end to the applicants’ situation 
brought about by its agents.318 By the ‘reasonable knowledge’ condition the Court thus 
means that the preventive positive obligation arises if the State’s authorities knew or ought 
to have known of a real and immediate risk to the life of an identified individual or 
individuals from the criminal acts of a third party.319 
It can be recalled that the reasoning of the UN Human Rights Committee concerning 
jurisdiction contains similar elements. If the risk of an extra-territorial violation of human 
rights is necessary and foreseeable – and there is a causal link – the jurisdiction can be found.  
3. Reasonable Means  
Because contextual differences regarding i.e. public funds and administrative resources exist 
and must be taken into account, the positive obligations should be interpreted in a way which 
does not impose an impossible or disproportionate burden on state authorities. In this respect, 
the Court determines or delimitates the scope of positive obligations using a variety of 
qualifying terms. Depending on the formulation, the State must take adequate, appropriate, 
necessary, sufficient, requisite or reasonable measures. These terms are also used in several 
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combinations, such as reasonable and appropriate, adequate and reasonable, adequate and 
effective, adequate and sufficient or necessary and sufficient, and the terms can be used 
interchangeably within the same judgment.320  
For the purposes of this thesis, I use the established wording ‘reasonable means’. This 
condition stands for such measures that were within the scope of the authorities’ powers and 
might have been expected to avoid that risk, but the authorities failed to take.321 After 
Osman, the Court has refined the test so that there is not always a need of a concrete risk, 
but there may be more general obligations to afford protection. According to Bljakaj and 
Others v. Croatia, ‘the positive obligation covers a wide range of sectors and, in principle, 
will arise in the context of any activity, whether public or not, in which the right to life may 
be at stake’.322 The central question in Bljakaj was whether violations of Article 2 had been 
caused by a failure on the part of the domestic authorities to take all necessary measures to 
afford protection from the violent acts of a mentally ill armed perpetrator.323  
In Bljakaj the Court noted that there were several measures that the authorities could 
‘reasonably have been expected to take to avoid the risk’.324 It could not have been possible 
to ‘conclude with certainty that matters would have turned out differently if the authorities 
had acted otherwise’, but ‘what is important, and sufficient to engage the responsibility of 
the State […], is that reasonable measures the domestic authorities failed to take could have 
had a real prospect of altering the outcome or mitigating the harm’.325  
4. The Requirement of Proximity 
In Bljakaj, Article 2 in question ‘does not require it to be shown that but for the failing or 
omission of the authorities the killing would not have occurred’.326 In other words, the causal 
link between the imagined action which would have been ‘proper and possible’ and the 
outcome does not need to be determined by the conditio sine qua non formula of the 
necessary condition.327 Rather, the Court can be seen as using a ‘proximity test’ in order to 
assess the nexus between the State’s conduct and the harm inflicted on the human right.  
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In cases of negative obligations, there is usually a relationship of directness or immediacy 
between the act of the State and the harm. Although in cases of positive obligations such 
relationship is less straightforward, the Court still requires a degree of proximity between 
the State omission and the harm suffered.328 In the aforementioned Tugar v. Italy the 
Commission explicitly applied a proximity or causality test reminiscent of the ‘proximate’ 
cause test of tort law that limits responsibility to those causes that have ‘sufficiently directly’ 
contributed to the infliction of harm.329 
Considerations of proximity typically arise in the context of linking an alleged failure to 
comply with a positive obligation to a particular harm, rather than in the broader context of 
determining whether such positive obligations exist in the first place. Therefore the 
application of the reasonable means test depends on the specific circumstances of the case, 
and the Court applies ‘contingent’ tests, which take account of both the need for effective 
protection and what can be reasonably expected from the State.330 When weighing the 
circumstances, the overarching principle of effectiveness should be utilized to guide the 
determination of the content of positive obligations.331  
In a way, proximity seems to be analogical to the ‘directness’ that could be held decisive for 
the existence of jurisdiction. Likewise, I think, there are similarities to the Human Rights 
Committee’s conditions for jurisdiction, which require the State to be a ‘link in the causal 
chain’ without presupposing a sine qua non causation. 
5. The Requirement of Effectiveness 
The principle of effectiveness, referred to repeatedly in the thesis, is the primary rationale 
for the development of positive obligations under almost every Convention article. It was 
established by the Court in the Marckx judgment.332 The principle delineates a range of 
means that are capable of protecting or ensuring human rights. If the State fails to use a 
means at its disposal or applies a means that is not capable of sufficiently protecting or 
ensuring the right concerned in practice, it must provide an adequate justification for its 
omission.333 
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A test or assessment of effectiveness as well as of reasonable means and proximity is 
exemplified in a recent judgment, which found that Finland had violated Article 2 by 
omission of its positive obligations. The case of Kotilainen and Others v. Finland concerns 
a school shooting in Kauhajoki in 2008. The tragedy took place, according to the applicants, 
because the police authorities had not confiscated the perpetrator’s weapon, thereby 
neglecting their positive obligation. In the decision, the Court first emphasizes the 
fundamental nature of Articles 2 and 3. It reminds that ‘[t]he object and purpose of the 
Convention as an instrument for the protection of individual human beings also requires that 
Article 2 be interpreted and applied so as to make its safeguards practical and effective’334, 
obliging the State ‘not only to refrain from the intentional and unlawful taking of life, but 
also to take appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of those within its jurisdiction’.335 
However, the Court adds that ‘[t]he positive obligation is to be interpreted in such a way as 
not to impose an excessive burden on the authorities’.336 Rephrasing Osman, the Court 
concludes that ‘[t]he crucial question is whether there were measures which the domestic 
authorities might reasonably have been expected to take to avoid the risk to life arising’.337  
The facts, circumstances and the context of the protection of public safety in the Kotilainen 
case are reminiscent of Bljakaj, albeit rather different from the S.S. case. One possibly 
relevant discussion for the case at hand can be found in the partly dissenting opinion of Judge 
Tim Eicke. He agrees with the majority in that ‘the judgment positively (and rightly in my 
view) concludes that the authorities did not know and could not reasonably have known of 
the existence of a real and immediate risk to life’,338 but claims that the Court created ‘a 
further obligation’ called additional ‘duty of diligence’, which is ‘over and above the duty 
to protect an identified individual as laid down in the Court’s Osman jurisprudence’.339  
It seems that Eicke criticizes the quantitative expansion of the ambit of the State’s positive 
obligations rather than suggesting the fabrication of a qualitatively novel concept, for the 
Court has referred to the doctrine of ‘due diligence’ in a number of earlier decisions in 
several different contexts.340 Although worded differently, ‘duty of diligence’ appears 
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similar to it. Be this as it may, including such a concept in the argumentation in the S.S. case 
is plausible and potentially cogent notwithstanding Eicke’s criticism in Kotilainen. 
6. Proportionality: Margin of Appreciation, Fair Balance 
In addition to the tests or assessments applied to the positive obligations, the core principle 
of subsidiarity allows the States a certain amount of discretion in their duty to protect the 
Convention rights. When judging the actions and omissions of a State, some ‘margin’ for 
interpretation also follows from the legal, moral and cultural divergence of the States Parties 
and the needed ‘European consensus’.341 For these reasons the ECtHR has developed its 
‘margin of appreciation’ doctrine.342 In Handyside v. the United Kingdom, the Court 
expressly noted that the States are in a better position than the Court is itself to assess the 
necessity of restrictive measures.343 
The Court has affirmed that the applicable principles of the doctrine are broadly similar 
whether the basis of the analysis is a negative duty upon a public authority not to interfere 
or a positive duty to take measures to secure the rights of the individual. In both contexts ‘a 
fair balance’ has to be struck between the competing interests of the individual and of the 
community as a whole, and in both contexts the State enjoys a certain margin of appreciation 
in determining the steps to be taken to ensure compliance with the Convention.344 In Women 
on Waves, however, the Court explicitly stated that if the obligation is positive rather than 
negative, the margin of appreciation granted to the State can be larger.345 
It is important to note that the doctrine of proportionality – in the form of margin of 
appreciation and fair balance – plays only a very limited role in relation to positive 
obligations arising from the Articles 2 and 3 ECHR. When allegations are made under those 
provisions, the Court’s scrutiny is therefore thorough and the review is strict,346 because a 
high level of protection has to be prescribed due to their semi-absolute and absolute status.347 
Nonetheless, even in some cases concerning the Articles 2 and 3 the Court can apply a test 
that allows some leeway and implies judicial restraint.  
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7. Of Evidence and Proof 
When there is an alleged violation of either Article 2 or 3, the Court needs to assess the 
factual evidence carefully. The Court has adopted, and confirmed in its case law, the standard 
of proof ‘beyond reasonable doubt’, which may follow from ‘the coexistence of sufficiently 
strong, clear and concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted presumptions of fact’.348 
Besides the right at stake and the nature of the allegation made, even the conduct of the 
parties when evidence is being obtained can be taken into account, and ‘the Court is also 
attentive to the seriousness that attaches to a ruling that a Contracting State has violated 
fundamental rights’.349  
Within the context of migration, asylum-seeking and forced returns, the Court has underlined 
that the Convention requires that the victim not be removed to the country in question, where 
‘substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the person concerned, if deported, 
faces a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3’.350 The assessment of 
the risk depends upon all of the circumstances351 and it must be rigorous, a heavy burden 
being placed upon the applicant to demonstrate the real risk of ill-treatment constituting 
substantial grounds.352 However, exactly because of the special circumstances in which 
asylum seekers may find themselves, the Court has emphasized that they must frequently be 
given ‘the benefit of the doubt when it comes to assessing the credibility of their statements 
and the documents submitted in support thereof’.353 
UNHCR Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status affirms that 
the general legal principle is that the burden of proof lies on the person submitting a claim. 
In refugee law, however, the cases in which an applicant can provide evidence of all his 
statements are the exception rather than the rule.354 If it were a requirement for a refugee to 
‘prove’ every part of his case, the majority of refugees would never be recognized. 
Therefore, after the applicant has made a genuine effort to substantiate the claim, there may 
still be a lack of evidence for some of the statements, impelling to give the applicant the 
benefit of the doubt.355 There are some limitations, though: the applicant’s statements must 
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be coherent and plausible and must not run counter to generally known facts. The benefit of 
the doubt should only be given when all available evidence has been obtained.356 The claims 
usually concern situations in which the applicant is entering a State, but in cases concerning 
interception and forced return the benefit of the doubt could be applicable, too. 
To conclude, by its omissions the State can be responsible for acts of private individuals that 
violate Convention rights where there is evidence that the State’s authorities connived or 
acquiesced,357 extending the obligation beyond their conduct to encompass a duty to ensure 
that third parties do not infringe the rights of individuals.358 Despite the margin of 
appreciation and the Osman test, the ECtHR must not take an overtly cautious approach to 
positive obligations. Should the Court refrain from imposing preventive obligations on 
States, it can be imagined that their duties could be evaded by outsourcing public interests 
far enough to break the chain of formal attribution359 – an important reminder for the case 
of S.S.  
The State’s positive obligation to secure human rights is an obligation of due diligence of 
the state doing all that it could reasonably be expected to do to protect a territory’s 
inhabitants even from third parties.360 In Manoilescu and Dobrescu v. Romania and Russia 
the Court referred to Ilaşcu and stated that ‘[e]ven in the absence of effective control of a 
territory outside its borders, the state still has a positive obligation under Article 1 to take 
the diplomatic, economic, judicial or other measures that it is in its power to take and are in 
accordance with international law to secure to the applicants the rights guaranteed by the 
Convention.’361 That is a strong requisite. 
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VI. Conclusions 
1. Jurisdiction 
In this last Chapter, I aim to assess the admissibility of the Application – whether the 
jurisdiction of Italy can be found – and then the alleged violations of the material Articles in 
the light of the various tests and criteria discussed above. 
The outcome of the decision in S.S. depends, firstly, on the jurisdiction criterium, as 
discussed in Chapter IV. Here, the Court can be seen as presented with two divergent main 
approaches. Under the more conservative approach, the condition of jurisdiction is 
restrictively interpreted as unambiguous effective control, a situation in which there exists a 
predefined relationship between the State and the individual.362 This view was very recently 
rephrased in the dissenting opinion of the UN Human Rights Committee decision. 
Another approach is present in some of the judgments and decisions of the ECtHR 
mentioned above – for example, Ilaşcu and Bljakaj. The starting point is that human rights 
obligations serve as a ‘code of conduct’ for all activity of a state regardless of territorial 
considerations, in which the condition of jurisdiction is satisfied if an act or omission of a 
state affects a person. The ‘functional jurisdiction’ proposed by Bonello and Moreno-Lax 
and demonstrated by the UN Human Rights Committee – and perhaps by the ‘duty of 
diligence’ recalled by Kotilainen and Others, too – appears to be essentially supportive of 
this more permissive code of conduct approach. The reasoning behind it is appealing from 
the perspective of effective human rights protection: the State must always be guided by the 
human rights obligations it has entered into, which can only implicate that it may not do 
towards a person in another country what it may not do to persons in its own territory.363  
In the S.S. case the conservative approach – the strict requirement of Italy’s effective control 
of the Libyan Coast Guard – would be likely to lead the Court to find that there is no 
sufficient jurisdictional link. That decision would leave the alleged violations unexplored 
and give Italy, the EU, and other Member States if not an encouragement, at least a 
permission to continue with bilateral agreements and endorse the pull-back operations by 
non-ECHR states. 
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In Ilaşcu it was considered that there was ‘a continuous and uninterrupted link of 
responsibility’ ensuing from, at least, from ‘the decisive influence’.364 By analogy, this 
reasoning can be seen as applying to the duties of States in the context of external processing 
of asylum claimants.365 A more permissive interpretation of jurisdiction is suggested by the 
principles of interpretation of the ECHR, discussed briefly above in Chapter III: the 
Convention should be interpreted in line with its underlying values and in an evolutive and 
dynamic manner, and it should effectively secure the rights it provides. 
In Hirsi Jamaa, the Court adjudicated that Italy cannot circumvent its jurisdiction under the 
Convention by describing the events in issue as rescue operations on the high seas, and 
dismissed the argument that ‘Italy was not responsible for the fate of the applicants on 
account of the allegedly minimal control exercised by the authorities over the parties 
concerned at the material time’.366 In the sense of the ‘functional jurisdiction’ proposed by 
Bonello and recently by Moreno-Lax, in S.S. the Court could sum up the extraterritorial 
effects of the control by the Italian MRCC and the overall contactless but effective control 
of, or at least decisive influence on, the Libyan Coast Guard, by the systematic funding and 
support. This could be sufficient for the admissability of the Application. 
Moreover, if the goal of the MoU is to intercept migrants before they reach the territorial 
scope of the ECHR – and bring them back to a country in which they are subjected to extreme 
forms of violence and exploitation – and thus ultimately to sever the jurisdictional link with 
Italy, it would be incompatible with the purpose and object of the ECHR if Italy was 
absolved of its responsibility.367 Neither should Italy be able to avoid responsibility by 
transferring functions to the FRONTEX or some other EU organ, because the transfer would 
also clearly go against the purpose and object of the Convention by limiting or excluding its 
guarantees at will and ‘thereby depriving it of its peremptory character and undermining the 
practical and effective nature of its safeguards’.368 The default subsidiarity rule under EU 
law is that ‘Member States shall retain primary responsibility for the management of their 
sections of the external borders’.369  
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If the Court comes to the conclusion that there existed a normative relationship between the 
migrants as the right-holders and the Italian authorities as the duty-bearers, it can rule that 
the case is admissible as Italy exercised jurisdiction. Thence the Court could move on to 
examine on the merits whether Italy breached its obligations by exposing the applicants to 
the risk of losing their lives and the risk of ill-treatment in Libya. In addition, the Court could 
examine whether Italy was responsible for violence that amounted to inhuman and degrading 
treatment when the passengers were on board the Libyan ship, and further, for a breach of 
the prohibition of slavery and forced labour. It could examine, as it did in Hirsi Jamaa, 
whether there was a violation of the right to an effective remedy and a risk of chain 
refoulement from Libya to the applicants’ countries of origin.370  
Within the scope of the thesis, I concentrate on the alleged breaches of Articles 2 and 3, and 
make only a brief note on the two other Articles. Before that I sum up the central evidence. 
2. The MoU and the Video Reconstruction as Proof or Evidence 
In Hirsi Jamaa, the Court observed that Italy cannot evade its own responsibility by relying 
on its obligations arising out of bilateral agreements with Libya. Even if it were to be 
assumed that those agreements made express provision for the return to Libya of migrants 
intercepted on the high seas, the Contracting States’ responsibility continues after their 
having entered into treaty commitments subsequent to the entry into force of the Convention 
or its Protocols.371 Italy was thus responsible under Article 1 ‘for all acts and omissions of 
its organs regardless of whether the act or omission in question was a consequence […] of 
the necessity to comply with international legal obligations’.372 
In S.S., rather than absolving Italy of responsibility, it seems that the MoU is the central 
piece of proof that the Court can refer to when establishing the jurisdiction and when 
examining the alleged omissions of positive obligations. The fact that the Hirsi Jamaa 
decision partly led to the suspension of the 2008 Treaty of Friendship, Partnership and 
Cooperation further corroborates the significance of the bilateral agreements. 
The MoU is not a real treaty in the sense of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(VCLT).373 If the general rule of interpretation of the VCLT is nonetheless applied to the 
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agreement, the agreement ‘shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object 
and purpose’.374 The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty comprises the 
text, including its preamble and annexes.375 The preamble of the MoU reaffirms ‘the resolute 
determination of cooperating to individuate urgent solutions to the irregular migrants matter 
which cross Libya to go to Europe by sea, through the provision of temporary hosting camps 
in Libya […] in anticipation of repatriation or voluntary return to the countries of origin’. 
The preamble aims ‘to ensure the reduction of illegal migratory fluxes’, to which end ‘the 
Italian party commits to provide technical and technologic support to the Libyan institutions’ 
according to Article 1(C). Article 2(5) promises ‘support to the present international 
organizations and that operate in Libya in the migration sector in order to continue the efforts 
also aiming to the migrants’ return to their countries of origin, including the voluntary 
return’.376 
Interpreted by the VCLT rules, it seems quite clear that the object and purpose of the MoU 
is the interception of migrants at sea by the Libyan authorities as well as their voluntary and 
forcible return (refoulement) to their countries of origin. That should prove the intention of 
Italy to support the kinds of actions that took place when Ras Jadir intercepted the migrants 
on 6.11.2017, their subsequent handling in Libya, and their forced return.  
Article 5 contains obligations pertaining to human rights. It requires the Parties to interpret 
and apply the MoU ‘in respect of the international obligations and the human rights 
agreements of which the two Countries are part of’. The formulation is vague, and ‘respect’ 
does not amount to a binding obligation. Especially problematic is the condition that both 
States should be under the same ‘agreements’, thus expressly leaving out the ECHR. 
Nonetheless, I hold that even based on this wording, Italy invokes responsibility to guarantee 
the fundamental human rights when cooperating with Libya – including those guaranteed by 
the ECHR, because the ‘treaty commitments’ of the MoU cannot override the prior entry of 
force of the Convention, as ruled in Hirsi Jamaa. 
Other sources of proof are the reconstruction and the statements of the applicants. The 
footage compiled of the wide-angle cameras mounted on the mast and the deck of the Sea 
Watch 3 vessel and from two cameras mounted on the RHIBs gives a reliable picture of the 
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events that unfolded. As far as the video corroborates the applicants’ statements, they should 
be interpreted as tenable, too. The Application contains also the victims’ claims that concern 
incidents that took place after they had embarked Ras Jadir and been taken back to Libya. 
To these accounts, the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt should be applied. The 
burden of proof is within the applicants, who might to some degree have the advantage of 
the benefit of the doubt. 
3. The Alleged Violation of Article 2 
In my view, the assessment of the alleged violation of Article 2 is more difficult than that of 
the other Articles. In Hirsi Jamaa, which otherwise is a helpful reference, the right to life 
does not come into question, as refoulement cases are regularly brought under Article 3. 
Therefore, it can be assumed that the risk to life in the countries of origin, Nigeria and Ghana, 
would also in S.S. fall under Article 3.  
The case of Ilaşcu involves an alleged violation of Article 2, but in relation to death penalty; 
the Court additionally considered that ‘the facts complained of by Mr Ilaşcu do not call for 
a separate examination under Article 2 of the Convention, but would be more appropriately 
examined under Article 3 instead’.377 As in Hirsi Jamaa, there were no actual deaths in 
Ilaşcu. Neither in Osman did the Court find a violation of Article 2;378 in the Kotilainen case 
it did. However, as mentioned, both of those cases are quite different from S.S. 
The MoU does not contain instructions or suggestions to depriving migrants of their lives, 
neither can it be interpreted as having that as its object or purpose. The video shows that the 
Libyan vessel has arrived to the scene and started the rescue operations. It is clear that the 
measures of the Ras Jadir crew are characterized by ineffectiveness and carelessness, if not 
outright brutality. Still, it can be hardly argued that the crew members had the intention to 
let the migrants drown, thus intentionally violating the right to life, although at least some 
of the deaths were likely caused by their negligence.  
The events could probably be framed as an accident. Alas, the Court’s case law of accidental 
deaths seems only to contain cases where there have been omissions of safety regulations 
for public transportation or industrial constructions, none of which are extraterritorial. 
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However, the whole assessment of the degree of culpability might be superfluous, as the 
question concerns the omissions of Italy’s positive obligations. By applying the Osman test 
to S.S., the first condition for responsibility is that Italy knew or should have known that the 
LYCG was likely to use careless measures – including the manoeuvring the vessel so that 
the forceful water movements threw people into the water, and neglecting to launch the 
RHIBs or to provide life jackets. The other condition is, rephrasing Osman and Kotilainen, 
the crucial question of whether there were measures which Italy might reasonably have been 
expected to take to avoid the risk to life arising.  
It seems that at the general level of the MoU some anticipation of Libya’s roughness could 
not be excluded, but whether it could reasonably have been expected to amount to deaths is 
harder to fathom. The Rome Maritime Coordination and Rescue Center could possibly have 
coordinated the rescue operation differently; on the other hand, the Italian helicopter did try 
to persuade Ras Jadir to stop. In the beginning of the operation, the LYCG did not respond 
or did not transmit further instructions. A strict reading of the MoU in the light of Libya’s 
reported overall dire human rights situation might lead to the conclusion that if Italy had 
been able to take another course of action, there would have been ‘a real prospect of altering 
the outcome or mitigating the harm’, reflecting Bljakaj.  
Italy will certainly argue that the criterium of proximity is not fulfilled. A direct causality is 
mostly excluded, but the systematic and determinate funding, equipping and training, 
together with the provisions of the MoU, could still establish the required nexus. 
Something that was not present in Hirsi Jamaa or Ilaşcu and that might weigh heavily is the 
priority of the rights of the child. Two of the applicants act on behalf of their minor children, 
who died during the interception and rescue operation. Functioning as one of the third-party 
interveners, Defence for Children the Netherlands requests the Court to take into account the 
involvement of children in the case and put this aspect at the centre of its considerations on 
the question as to the positive obligations and jurisdiction,379 referring to the UN Convention 
on the Rights of the Child (CRC),380 to a comment of the Committee on the Rights of the 
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Child381 and to the decisions of the Court in Popov v. France382 and Tarakhel v. 
Switzerland.383 Defence for Children the Netherlands reminds that the Committee on the 
Rights of the Child has demonstrated its concern about all international, regional or bilateral 
cooperation agreements focused on restricting migration that negatively impact children’s 
rights.384 Thus, the Court might find the crew’s disregard especially aggravating if it is 
shown that it led to the deaths of the children. 
My estimation is that the Court could be careful with Article 2 and consider that the deaths 
were accidental, and that Italy could not have foreseen them to take place. Therefore, it is 
possible that the Court would not find a violation of Article 2 in S.S. 
4. The Alleged Violation of Article 3 
Article 3 has mainly been applied where the risk to the individual of a violation emanates 
from intentional acts inflicted by State agents or public authorities, but it also has a positive 
dimension to the right requiring the State to take action to prevent torture and inhuman or 
degrading treatment being inflicted by persons not acting on behalf of the State.385 As with 
Article 2, the Court has developed a ‘procedural obligation’ contained within Article 3 and 
assisted by Article 1, by which the State is required to investigate and prosecute cases of 
torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment even when the acts themselves 
cannot be imputed to the State.386 
As suggested before, there are substantive grounds for finding violations of Article 3 in S.S. 
Reflecting again on Hirsi Jamaa, the Court would likely observe that ‘two different aspects 
of Article 3 of the Convention are in issue and must be examined separately’, namely the 
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risk that the applicants would suffer inhuman and degrading treatment by the LYCG and in 
Libya, and secondly the danger of being returned to their respective countries of origin.387 
Starting with the non-refoulement aspect, in Hirsi Jamaa the Court took into consideration 
the fact that Italy returned the migrants to Libya, a country that it knew – thanks to the 
extensive amount of reports from international organizations – would expose them to 
degrading treatment, and potentially return them to countries such as Eritrea and Somalia, 
where human rights violations are also widespread.388 The Court noted that the situation in 
Libya ‘was well known and easy to verify on the basis of multiple sources’, and considered 
that ‘when the applicants were removed, the Italian authorities knew or should have known 
that, as irregular migrants, they would be exposed in Libya to treatment in breach of the 
Convention and that they would not be given any kind of protection in that country’.389 
The consequences for migrants who returned to Libya have been documented and 
condemned by UNHCR, UNSMIL, OHCHR, and the UN Secretary General (see Chapter 
II). Additionally, the third-party interveners to the S.S. case reiterate the dire conditions in 
the detention camps in Libya and the risk of forced return to the countries of origin.  
In its intervention as a third party, UNHCR reminds that it has clarified in a 2015 update that 
Libya could not be considered a ‘place of safety’ for disembarking people rescued at sea, 
and that this has remained UNHCR’s public position, including throughout 2017, and has 
been repeated in several updates.390 Another intervener, the Council of Europe 
Commissioner for Human Rights, stresses that member states’ migration management 
practices in the Central Mediterranean have led to the increased return of migrants, asylum 
seekers and refugees to Libya, resulting in them being exposed to torture or inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment, and that the member states knew, or should have known, 
about the risk of such serious human rights violations occurring.391 Additionally, what is 
said above of the special vulnerable status of children, holds true for Article 3, as well. 
Generally, then, it seems obvious that Italy was aware of the existence of a real and 
immediate risk to the life of the immigrants and of a risk of ill-treatment. More specifically, 
the knowledge of Italy must have been confirmed by an incident that took place just briefly 
before the events of the S.S. case. On 27.9.2017, an Italian warship notified the LYCG of 
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two migrant boats in distress 20 nautical miles off the Libyan coast. It is not clear if the 
warship prevented the migrant boats from continuing their journey, but instead of rescuing 
the migrants itself, or contacting the merchant vessels or NGO boats nearby, it allowed the 
LYCG intercept the migrants.392 By these omissions, Italy did not comply with its positive 
obligations resulting to the migrants’ forcible return to Libya.393 
In the light of the several reports and the recent similar incident, it can be argued that the 
Italian MRCC, acting de facto as coordinator of the SAR operation, knew or should have 
known that the involvement of Ras Jadir was bound to lead to the disembarkation of the 
survivors in Libya. Reflecting again on Hirsi Jamaa, Italy cannot be ‘exempt from 
complying with its obligations under Article 3 of the Convention because the applicants 
failed to ask for asylum or to describe the risks faced as a result of the lack of an asylum 
system in Libya’, but ‘the Italian authorities should have ascertained how the Libyan 
authorities fulfilled their international obligations in relation to the protection of refugees’.394 
In S.S., the Court will therefore likely consider that the Italian authorities knew or at least 
should have known that the applicants faced the risk of ill-treatment. It is also likely that the 
reasonable means condition is met, because Italy could have refrained from entering into the 
MoU agreement that effectively leads to the pull-backs and refoulement. And as for the 
proximity criterium, the requirement should be met more easily than for Article 2, too. 
The victims reported that they had been beaten and possibly also restricted by ropes by the 
crew of Ras Jadir, and the video reconstruction corroborates the reports of the victims to 
some degree. In order to amount to a violation of Article 3, the interference with the integrity 
of the migrants must esteemed to have attained ‘a minimum level of severity and disrespect 
a person’s humanity’.395 The assessment of the threshold depends on all the circumstances 
of the case such as the duration of the treatment, its physical or mental effects, and in some 
cases the sex, age, or state of health of the victim – here particularly the children’s. The acts 
of the crew can be considered as ‘degrading treatment’, if it is shown that the acts humiliated 
or debased the migrants, diminished their human dignity, or aroused in them ‘feelings of 
fear, anguish or inferiority capable of breaking [their] moral and physical resistance’.396 
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Khlaifia and Others was decided four years after Hirsi Jamaa. The case concerns Tunisian 
migrants fleeing the events of the Arab Spring. They were intercepted by the Italian coast 
guard interdicted in September 2011, brought to a reception and aid center (Centro di 
Soccorso e Prima Accoglienza, CSPA), commonly known as a migration ‘hotspot’, on the 
island of Lampedusa, and later deported to Tunisia. In the judgment, the Court notes that the 
‘ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 
3’ and reminded that ‘the assessment of that level is relative and depends on all the 
circumstances of the case, principally the duration of the treatment, its physical or mental 
effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim’.397 
The Court went on to list other factors that can be taken into consideration. These are ‘the 
purpose for which the ill-treatment was inflicted, together with the intention or motivation 
behind it’, ‘the context in which the ill-treatment was inflicted, such as an atmosphere of 
heightened tension and emotions’ and the possibly vulnerable situation of the victim, 
concluding that ‘there is an inevitable element of suffering and humiliation involved in 
custodial measures and this as such, in itself, will not entail a violation of Article 3’.398 The 
Court did not find the violation, departing remarkably from its prior jurisprudence by 
pointing to the role of context when interpreting the meaning of Article 3 rights and eroding 
the absolute character of the prohibitions within the provision.399 The said context was the 
post-Arab Spring influx of migrants to Europe and the difficult circumstances that Italy faced 
– something that could apply to the S.S. case, too. 
It seems that there is very a narrow margin of discretion for the Court. In the end, the rather 
unfortunate Khlaifia decision notwithstanding, I would assume that the violation of Article 
3 is found, mainly due to the centrality of the non-refoulement doctrine. 
5. The Alleged Violations of Article 4, Article 13 and Article 4 of Protocol 4 
As mentioned, I give only a brief outline regarding the other alleged Article violations. Here 
I reflect essentially on Hirsi Jamaa, and conjecture, mutatis mutandis, what the Court could 
decide. Starting with Article 13, the ‘automatism’ of the transfer to Libya may breach the 
notion of an effective remedy. In the case of Hirsi Jamaa, the special nature of the maritime 
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environment could not exclude Italy’s jurisdiction,400 and the Court found a violation of 
Article 13 in conjunction with Article 3 of the Convention and Article 4 of Protocol 4 due 
to the lack of any suspensive remedies by which to applicants could have lodged their 
complaints with a competent authority and to obtain a thorough and rigorous assessment of 
their requests before the removal measure was enforced.401  
The Court has indicated that expulsion orders have to be served in writing, after an individual 
examination of the case, following a legal procedure previously established by law, stating 
the reasons and indicating the means and conditions to appeal, before deportation. The video 
reconstruction of the scene cannot prove the alleged violation of the procedural Article 13, 
and not much can be derived from the MoU. It seems indisputable, though, as the applicants 
were not allowed any form of independent and rigorous scrutiny nor a prompt and impartial 
investigation. 
Neither are the alleged violations of Article 4 regarding slavery and forced labour and Article 
4 of Protocol No. 4 regarding collective expulsion something that can be evidenced by the 
video footage or by the MoU. As for Article 4 of Protocol No. 4, given the circumstances of 
the incident and the fact that the migrants were returned to Libya, it appears indisputable 
that the applicants were submitted to collective expulsion. In Hirsi Jamaa, the Court held 
unanimously that there has been a violation of this provision: the applicants had not 
undergone any identity checks and the authorities had merely put the migrants, who had 
been intercepted on the high seas, onto military vessels to take them back to Libya. 
In Khlaifia and Others the Court refers to Hirsi Jamaa, noting that ‘it is necessary to consider 
the circumstances of the case and […] the specific situation of the individuals concerned’ 
when determining whether there has been a ‘sufficiently individualised’ examination.402 
Regard must also be had to the particular circumstances of the expulsion and to the general 
context at the material time. In Khlaifia the Court found a violation of Article 13 of the 
Convention taken together with Article 3,403 but did not find a violation of Article 13 taken 
together with Article 4 of Protocol No. 4404 nor of  Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 itself.405  
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I think that insofar the Court finds that there is jurisdiction, in S.S. it, similarly to Hirsi 
Jamaa, finds the violation of the prohibition of collective expulsion, as the only difference 
seems to that the expulsion was done by proxy.  
As for Article 4, the applicants could additionally have been exposed to forced labour either 
in Libya or in their countries of origin, if returned there – or in both. However, without the 
support of  Hirsi Jamaa, or Khlaifia, neither of which included this Article, I refrain from 
further conjecture about Article 4. 
6. Final Remarks 
By writing this thesis I have substantially increased my understanding of the Court’s 
procedure, jurisprudence and interpretation of the Convention. Even so, it is not at all easy 
to foresee its argumentation, not to speak of its decision, in a complicated and novel case 
like S.S. The dynamic and evolutive – may I say fluctuating – interpretation of the 
Convention leaves a lot of room for the Court to operate, and its decisions will also be 
affected by the particular composition of judges. The Court is not completely free from the 
current political situation, either. I will wrap up the thesis with some notes on this issue. 
In its effort to create a zone of free movement within, the EU and the Member States have 
used measures that not only sit uncomfortably with the very principles of proportionality 
and non-discrimination of the Union itself, but can outright violate the articles of human 
rights conventions and charters. As far as it can be established that the measures are within 
the jurisdiction of the Member States, the victims can, at least, apply to the European Court 
of Human Rights, in hope for effective protection and remedies. 
However, if the Member States, or the Union, succeed in outsourcing the border control 
activities – the ‘dirty work’ – to the main transit countries, the fundamental rights violations 
become much harder to prevent and detect. The border control by proxy to guarantee 
freedom, safety and justice for those within the EU will have a high price for those who are 
left outside. To allow such outsourcing could also lead to a slippery slope of externalization 
or privatization of States’ fundamental tasks and responsibilities such as the police or armed 
forces. Morally, therefore, it is easy to come to the conclusion that in S.S. the Court should 
find Italy’s jurisdiction as well as violations of at least some of the Articles – probably most 
poignantly of Article 3. 
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It remains to be seen whether the pull-back practices are in place when the Court rules on 
the S.S. case but, if they still are, the impact of this judgment could be as significant as Hirsi 
Jamaa, which led to the abandonment of the 2008 Treaty of Friendship, Partnership and 
Cooperation between Italy and Libya. If the Court invalidates the outsourcing practices, Italy 
will be compelled to revise its migration control policies in the Central Mediterranean and 
probably reconsider the MoU altogether. In that sense, the judgment can be compared to 
M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, too, which led to a suspension of transfers to Greece under 
the Dublin Regulation.406 The Court held that asylum conditions in Greece were so 
deteriorated that not only Greece had violated the the ECHR, but also Belgium for having 
transferred an asylum seeker back to Greece. 
According to Article 46 of the Convention the judgments of the Court are officially binding 
only to the parties to the case.407 However, the Court’s interpretations are regarded as  
determining the meaning of the concepts and principles of the ECHR, and the Parties to the 
Convention have committed themselves to the developing case law under the res 
interpretata effect.408 Thus, even if the application of the principles in various circumstances 
and to the concrete facts of different cases remains particularized, the S.S. judgment could 
have a significant impact on other States’ border control strategies and policies, too. 
Given the ties between human rights and political authority through its jurisdiction, the 
ECtHR is expected to take political concerns seriously when deciding cases of 
extraterritorial application of the Convention.409 Although finding the violations in Hirsi 
Jamaa, the Court already in its judgment of 2012 acknowledged ‘the difficulties related to 
the phenomenon of migration by sea, involving for States additional complications in 
controlling the borders in southern Europe’.410 The Court noted that these States experience 
‘considerable difficulties in coping with the increasing influx of migrants and asylum-
seekers’, exacerbated by the European economic crisis.411  
Hirsi Jamaa was decided before the so-called refugee crisis of 2015–2016, which escalated 
anti-immigration discourses and drove the policy makers to try to stop, or at least reduce, 
irregular migration flows at all costs. So, even given that the Court has not shied away from 
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controversial decisions in the past, it may take into account the highly politicized context of 
immigration and adopt a cautious approach when deciding on a politically charged case.412 
With a chronic overload of applications,413 the Court might prefer to avoid a landslide of 
new cases based on a similar claim of indirect, extraterritorial jurisdiction.  
In the past few years, Italy has been more and more vocal regarding its need for a solution 
to the heavy fluxes of migrants crossing the Mediterranean to reach its borders. For its part 
– in line with its approach in Turkey – the EU has backed Italy’s efforts in Libya, but has let 
Italy take the lead in the accord.414 Italy has been praised for its rescue operations, which 
have saved countless lives at sea. However, Italy stresses that it cannot bear the burden of 
helping and taking illegal migrants in large numbers and has repeatedly called for the EU to 
provide a durable solution.415 
In Khlaifia and Others the Court emphasized, firstly, that the States may establish and keep 
up their own immigration policies according to their sovereignty and the subsidiarity 
principle. Secondly, it recognized the difficult situation of Italy ‘as a result of the economic 
crisis […] and the fact that migratory flows are increasingly arriving by sea’.416 Italy was 
influenced by the reality of the post-Arab Spring influx of migrants to Europe and the 
difficult circumstances as a result. The judgment can be seen as giving the States more 
leeway to manage mass influxes of migrants.417 Khlaifia and Others was decided four years 
after Hirsi Jamaa and right amidst the ‘crisis’ in 2016, but it concerned the earlier events of 
2011. The numbers of people crossing the Mediterranean rose significantly after that. On the 
other hand, the Court reminded – referring again to Hirsi Jamaa – that ‘problems with 
managing migratory flows or with the reception of asylum-seekers cannot justify recourse 
to practices which are not compatible with the Convention or the Protocols thereto’.418 
The New Pact planned by the EU Commission underlines the need for solidarity. All 
Member States of the union should receive refugees, but many of them certainly do not do 
that and do not want to do that in the future, either. When the EU faced a growing number 
of asylum applications in 2015, it decided to set up refugee quotas. These were opposed most 
 
412 Pijnenburg 2018, p. 407 
413 The Court had 59,800 pending applications 31.12.2019; ECtHR Guide 2020: Admissibility Criteria, p. 7 
414 Baczynska, Gabriela: EU sticks to Libya strategy on migrants, despite human rights concerns, Reuters, 
Sept. 14, 2017, 9:11 AM, https://www.reuters.com/article/useurope-migrants-libya-italy/eu-sticks-to-libya-
strategy-on-migrants-despite-human-rights-concerns-idUSKCN1BP2CQ 
415 Vari 2020, p. 114 
416 Khlaifia and Others v. Italy 2016, para. 241 
417 Goldenziel 2018, p. 279 
418 Khlaifia and Others v. Italy 2016, para. 241 
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fiercely by the so-called Visegrad Group consisting of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland 
and Slovakia. Despite the fact that Hungary is the only one of them that has direct experience 
of the migration flow, these States have continued to resist any relocation efforts. 
The Visegrad quartet is not alone, however. In most Member States, the asylum politics 
remains high on the lists not only of the populist right-wing parties. Denmark expressed 
recently its goal of ‘zero asylum seekers’, as the Danish Prime Minister reinforced the 
government’s restrictive stance on immigration – although already in 2020 Denmark saw 
the lowest number of asylum seekers since 1998, with only 1,547 people applying.419 Most 
striking is the plan to make contracts with non-EU, most likely African, states in order 
process asylum seekers’ claims outside of both the EU and the ECHR and, if seekers are 
granted asylum, to keep them in that third country.420 This is rather unexpected if not 
alarming for a Scandinavian country known for its liberal and tolerant society – and 
governed by a left-wing coalition. 
Justice is certainly not done if Italy, and the other EU Member States facing a 
disproportionally heavy burden of migration, are offered no solidarity. Likewise, punishing 
Italy for the border control measures without punishing the Union that endorses them, feels 
insufficient and unsatisfactory. The numbers of asylum seekers overall have decreased, but 
that is likely to be temporary – caused to a large extent by the Covid-19 pandemic – and the 
big issue of migration has definitely not disappeared. The pandemic has restricted movement 
within the AFSJ, too, and taken a grave toll on the European economy, which is prone to 
make many Member States even more reluctant to immigration.  
 
419 Info Migrants 25.1.2021, https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/29842/denmark-aims-for-zero-asylum-
seekers 
420 Politico 10.3.2021, https://www.politico.eu/article/denmark-has-gone-far-right-on-refugees/ 
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Appendix 1 
 
Application No. 21660/18 to ECtHR 
S.S. and others against Italy, brought 26.6.2019 (3.5.2018) 
 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The applicants, whose initials appear in the annexed list, are sixteen Nigerien nationals 
and one Ghanaian national. Two of them are also acting on behalf of their minor children, 
who died during the events which are the subject of the application. The applicants are 
represented before the Court by Ms V. Moreno Lax, law graduate from Queen Mary 
University in London, Mr Itamar Mann, law graduate from Haifa University and Ms CL 
Cecchini and L. Leo, lawyers in Rome. 
A. The circumstances of the case 
2. The facts of the case, as presented by the applicants, may be summarized as follows. 
3. The seventeen applicants are part of a group of approximately one hundred and fifty 
people who, during the night between 5 and 6 November 2017, left Libya in a rubber dinghy. 
At 6 a.m. on 6 November 2017, the Rome Maritime Coordination and Rescue Center 
(MRCC) received a distress message from the applicants' boat. He called on all nearby ships 
to step in to rescue the sinking dinghy. 
4. Three ships were in the vicinity of the craft: the Dutch rescue vessel Sea Watch 3 (SW3), 
the French military vessel Premier Maître l’Her, and the Libyan coast guard Ras Jadir. An 
Italian military navy helicopter also arrived at the scene. 
5. SW3 contacted the Rome MRCC, which authorized him to join and rescue the boat. The 
French ship offered its aid to SW3 then tried, on several occasions, to contact the Libyan 
coast guard in order to coordinate operations, without obtaining a response. 
6. The Ras Jadir joined the boat first. According to the applicants, the water movement 
caused by the Libyan vessel caused the death of several people who were on board the boat 
and who were suddenly thrown into the water. Also according to the applicants, the crew of 
the Libyan ship did not provide life jackets, hit the people in the water with ropes and 
threatened them with weapons. 
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7. It appears from the file that the Italian military authorities made several attempts to contact 
the Libyan crew, asking them to shut down the vessel's engines and coordinate rescue 
operations with SW3. The Ras Jadir refused to cooperate with SW3, claiming to have been 
designated as the vessel responsible for the on-scene rescue (On Scene Commander). 
8. SW3 began rescuing those in the water at around eight in the morning, assisted by an 
Italian Navy helicopter, and took on board several migrants, including nine of the applicants. 
9. Eight applicants first boarded the Ras Jadir; then, six of them escaped with others to join 
SW3. They claim to have suffered several injuries by the Libyan coast guard. 
10. The crew of SW3 also recovered the bodies of those who died at sea, including the bodies 
of two children, sons of the applicants S.S. and R.J. respectively. 
11. The applicants R.J. and E.R.O., who remained on board the Ras Jadir, were allegedly 
tied up by ropes, beaten and threatened by the Libyan crew; they were reportedly taken to a 
detention camp in Tajura, Libya, where they were reportedly subjected to ill-treatment and 
violence. On a date that has not been specified, they were repatriated to Nigeria as part of 
the voluntary humanitarian return assistance program of the International Organization for 
Migration (O.I.M.). 
12. According to the information transmitted to the Court, the fifteen applicants who boarded 
SW3 were transported to Italy, where they currently reside. The two applicants who 
remained on board the Ras Jadir, namely R. J. and E.R.O., currently reside in Nigeria. They 
are all reachable by phone and / or email. 
B. Relevant domestic law 
Bilateral agreements between Italy and Libya 
13. Before the Libyan civil war of 2011, Italy and Libya signed agreements concerning the 
fight against illegal immigration (for more details, see Hirsi Jamaa and others v. Italy [GC], 
no 27765/09 ECHR 2012). According to a statement by the Italian Defense Minister on 
February 26, 2011, the application of these agreements was suspended. 
14. On April 3, 2012, the Italian Interior Minister visited Libya to re-launch cooperation on 
immigration matters. According to its response to parliamentary question No. 4-06711, an 
agreement was signed on this occasion ”providing for cooperation initiatives in the field of 
public security, in particular for the fight against criminal organizations which manage the 
smuggling of migrants, the training of the police force, the control of the coasts and the 
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reinforcement of the surveillance of the Libyan borders, in order to encourage the voluntary 
repatriation of the migrants”. The text of this agreement is not public. 
15. On February 2, 2017, the Italian government and the Libyan government of national 
agreement (formed in 2016 under the aegis of the UN) signed in Rome a Memorandum of 
Understanding for cooperation in the field of development, strengthening of border security 
between Libya and Italy, prevention of illegal immigration, trafficking in human beings and 
smuggling. 
Under Article 1 of the said Protocol: 
”The Parties undertake to 
a) launch cooperation initiatives, in accordance with the programs and activities of the 
Presidential Council and the Government of Libya of National Accord, concerning 
assistance to military and security institutions, to reduce the flow of irregular migrants and 
deal with their consequences, in accordance with the Treaty of Friendship, Partnership and 
Cooperation and other agreements and conventions signed in this area; 
(..) 
c) Italy provides technical and technological support to the Libyan authorities responsible 
for combating illegal immigration, in particular the border police and the coast guards of the 
Ministry of Defence, as well as other relevant departments close to the Ministry of interior.” 
Under Article 4 of the Protocol, Italy funds the initiatives provided for in the agreement, as 
well as those envisaged by a joint Italian-Libyan committee. 
C. Relevant elements of international law 
1. The International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (‘SAR Convention’) 
(1979, amended in 2004) 
16. Both Italy and Libya are parties to the SAR Convention, drawn up by the International 
Maritime Organization (IMO). Article 2 of the SAR Convention provides: 
“2.1.4 Each search and rescue region is established by agreement between the Parties 
concerned. The Secretary-General is informed of the conclusion of such an agreement. 
(...) 
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2.1.6 Any agreement on the regions or provisions mentioned in paragraphs 2.1.4 and 2.1.5 
shall be recorded by the Parties concerned or recorded in writing in the form of plans 
accepted by the Parties.” 
Article 4 of the SAR Convention provides: 
”4.7.1 The activities of search and rescue units and other assets involved in search and rescue 
operations are coordinated on the spot so as to achieve the most effective results. 
4.7.2 When several assets are preparing to initiate search and rescue operations and when 
the rescue coordination center or rescue sub-center deems it necessary, the most capable 
person should be designated as the on-site coordinator as soon as possible and, preferably, 
before the arrival of the means in the determined area of operations. Specific responsibilities 
are assigned to the on-site coordinator, taking into account the skills he appears to have and 
operational needs. 
4.7.3 If there is no responsible rescue coordination center, or if for some reason the 
responsible rescue coordination center is unable to coordinate the search and rescue mission, 
participating means should jointly designate an on-site coordinator.” 
2. Communication from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy (HRU) on ”Migration along the Central Mediterranean route Managing 
migration flows, saving lives” 
17. In January 2017, the HRU sent a joint communication to the European Parliament, the 
European Council and the Council, on the general situation of migratory flows in the 
Mediterranean and the management projects of these flows financed by the European Union. 
Referring to the cooperation of the European Union and Italy with Libya, the HRU said 
(p.7): 
“The capacity building of the Libyan Coast Guard aims, in the long term, to achieve a 
situation in which the Libyan authorities can demarcate a search and rescue zone fully in 
line with international obligations. With this in mind, the EU is providing financial support 
to the Italian Coast Guard to help their Libyan counterparts set up a maritime rescue 
coordination center, a prerequisite for effectively coordinating search and rescue operations 
in the region. Libyan search and rescue zone, in accordance with international regulations.” 
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3. Italy’s report to the International Maritime Organization (IMO) 
18. On December 15, 2017, Italy presented to IMO a report on the results of Italian-Libyan 
cooperation in the ”Libyan Coordination and Rescue Center Project” funded by the 
European Commission. The conclusions of the report are as follows: 
“4. The Italian Coast Guard has a decisive role in strengthening the capacity of the competent 
Libyan authorities in the search and rescue region. The assistance given to the Libyan 
authorities for the establishment of a maritime coordination and rescue center, and for the 
conclusion of agreements with neighbouring countries concerning the search and rescue 
zone, could, in the medium or long term, strengthen the operational capacity of the 
competent Libyan authorities for maritime surveillance operations and contrast to irregular 
migration.” 
19. Libya declared its SAR zone in June 2018. 
D. International documents concerning the situation of migrants in Libya 
1. The position of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) on 
returns to Libya 
20. In September 2018, UNHCR released the second update of its position on returns to 
Libya. In it, UNHCR describes the situation of migrants in Libya as follows: 
“17. Asylum seekers, refugees and migrants who pass through or remain in Libya are in a 
particularly vulnerable situation in the context of the unstable security situation and 
deteriorating socio-economic conditions. The majority of asylum seekers, refugees and 
migrants do not have access to residence permits, and they are at high risk of arrest and 
detention for illegal stay. Due to their irregular status, the absence of official documents and 
widespread discriminatory practices (particularly, but not only, against people from 
countries south of the Sahara), they are often excluded from social security mechanisms and 
are would be denied access to basic services, including emergency care, so that their living 
conditions are precarious. Many are therefore forced to turn to survival strategies. According 
to a December 2017 study, there is no difference in terms of access to resources and services 
between refugees and migrants who have resided for a long time in the country and those 
who have arrived more recently. 
(...) 
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19. After an interception or rescue at sea, the Libyan Coast Guard (GCL) hand over the 
collected persons to the authorities of the Directorate for the Fight against Illegal Migration 
(DCIM), who transfer them directly to government detention centers. where they are held 
for an indefinite period. Currently, there is no possibility of release, except in the case of 
repatriation, evacuation or resettlement in a third country. UNHCR currently estimates that 
more than 8,000 people, including more than 4,500 of one of the nine nationalities UNHCR 
is able to register in Libya, are being held in detention centers run by the UNHCR. DCIM 
after having been rescued or intercepted at sea, or after having been arrested on land during 
house raids or identity checks, particularly near land borders. There are no data available on 
people held by different armed factions or criminal networks in unofficial detention centers, 
including warehouses and farms. No matter the location: according to sources, the conditions 
of detention do not meet international criteria and have been described as ‘appalling’, 
‘nightmarish’, ‘cruel, inhuman and degrading’. Asylum seekers, refugees and migrants, 
whether men, women or children, are systematically, or are at great risk of being, victims of 
torture and other forms of ill-treatment, including rape and other forms of sexual violence, 
forced labor and extortion, both in official and unofficial detention centers. Examples of 
religious and racial discrimination in detention were also reported. Detainees have no 
opportunity to challenge the lawfulness of their detention or treatment. Third-country 
nationals in detention are also suffering from the general security situation in the country, 
such as violent fighting between rival armed groups in Tripoli at the end of August 2018.” 
2. The Amnesty International report 
21. In its 2017/2018 Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the World, Amnesty 
describes the situation in Libya as follows: 
“Migrants, refugees and asylum seekers were widely and systematically subjected to serious 
human rights abuses in detention centers and at the hands of Libyan coast guards, smugglers 
and armed groups. Some have been taken into custody after being intercepted at sea by the 
Libyan coast guard as they attempted to cross the Mediterranean to Europe. It was estimated 
that some 20,000 people were held in detention centers run by the Directorate for Combating 
Illegal Migration (DCIM), a branch of the GUN Interior Ministry. The conditions of 
detention there were appalling, with extreme overcrowding, a lack of medical care and food, 
and systematic acts of torture and other ill-treatment, including sexual violence, beatings and 
acts of violence. extortion. DCIM controlled between 17 and 36 official centers, but several 
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thousand illicit places of detention throughout the country were in the hands of armed groups 
and criminal gangs engaged in highly lucrative human trafficking.” 
3. Statement by the President of the United Nations Security Council (PCS) S / PRST / 
2017/24 
22. On December 7, 2017, the PCS presented the following statement: 
“The Security Council expresses its deep concern at reports indicating that migrants are sold 
as slaves in Libya.” 
GRIEVANCES 
Relying on Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention, read in conjunction with Article 1 of the 
Convention, the applicants complained that the Rome MRCC, by allowing Ras Jadir to take 
part in the rescue operations, had exposed them at risk of ill-treatment and at risk of death. 
According to the applicants, the Italian authorities had failed in their positive obligations 
under Articles 2 and 3 to protect their lives and their physical integrity vis-à-vis the actions 
of the crew of the Ras Jadir. They claim that the Italian authorities could not have been aware 
that the Libyan refoulement practices are contrary to the standards of the Convention. 
The applicants E.K., A.A, I.A., M.O., J.O. and R.J., allege that they were injured and ill-
treated by the Libyan Coast Guard during the rescue operations coordinated by the Rome 
MRCC. 
The applicants S.S. and R.J. complain about the death of their respective children, which 
occurred during the sinking of the boat in which they were traveling. 
Relying on Articles 3 and 4 of the Convention, all the applicants allege that they were 
exposed to the risk of being returned to Libya, a country in which irregular migrants are 
detained in inhuman and degrading conditions and risk being subjected to slavery. They are 
also said to have run the risk of being arbitrarily repatriated to their countries of origin. 
Relying on Articles 3 of the Convention and 4 of Protocol No. 4, read in conjunction with 
Article 1, applicants RJ and ERO allege that they were illegally returned to Libya, where 
they were subjected to the torture and inhuman and degrading conditions of detention. They 
also complain about the conditions of their repatriation to Nigeria, decided in the absence of 
sufficient guarantees. 
Relying on Article 13 of the Convention, read in conjunction with Articles 2 and 3 of the 
Convention and 4 of Protocol No. 4, the applicants complained that it was impossible to 
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challenge before the judicial authorities the ill-treatment inflicted by the crew of the Ras 
Jadir, the illegal refoulement to Libya, the mistreatment suffered there, and the risk of being 
repatriated to their country of origin. 
QUESTIONS TO THE PARTIES: 
1. Do the facts complained of by the applicants in the present case fall within the jurisdiction 
of Italy? 
2. In view of the applicants’ allegations and the reports relating to the rescue at sea of the 
applicants' boat (see application form and attached documents), did the Italian authorities 
expose the applicants to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention? 
3. Was the right to life of the children of the applicants S.S. and R.J. respected? 
4. In the light of the information from several international sources concerning the living 
conditions of illegal migrants in Libya, did the Italian authorities expose the applicants to 
the risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention? and to be 
subjected to slavery within the meaning of Article 4 of the Convention? 
5. The return to Libya of the applicants R.J. and E.R.O. Does it amount to a collective 
expulsion contrary to Article 4 of Protocol No. 4? 
6. Did the applicants have access to an effective remedy before a national body guaranteed 
by Article 13 of the Convention to assert their rights guaranteed by Articles 2, 3 and 4 of 
Protocol No. 4? 
INFORMATION REQUEST: 
The parties are also invited to provide the Court with the following information: 
- Did the rescue of the applicants’ boat take place in an area of S.A.R. (search and rescue) 
responsibility? 
- Was the Rome MRCC responsible for coordinating the search and rescue mission of the 
applicants’ vessel under the "SAR Convention"? Which vessel was designated responsible 
for organizing the on-site rescue operations (On Scene Commander)? 
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Appendix 2 
 
Italy-Libya agreement: The Memorandum of Understanding 
Memorandum of understanding on cooperation in the development sector, to combat illegal 
immigration, human trafficking and contraband and on reinforcing the border security 
between the Libya State and the Italian Republic the National Reconciliation Government 
of Libya State and the Italian Republic Government, here it follows ‘The Parties’ mentioned 
They are determined to work in order to face all the challenges which have negative 
repercussions on peace, security and stability within the two countries and in the 
Mediterranean region in general. 
In the awareness of the sensitiveness of the present transition phase in Libya and the 
necessity to continue on supporting the efforts aiming to the national reconciliation, in view 
of the stabilization that allows the formation of a civil and democratic Country. 
Recognizing the common historical and cultural heritage and the strong bond of friendship 
between the two people are the basis to face the issues coming from continuous and high 
fluxes of irregular migrants. 
Reaffirming the principles of Libya sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and 
national unity, besides the non-interference in internal affairs. 
In order to implement the subscribed agreements with regard to the Parties, including the 
Treaty of Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation signed in Bengasi on August 30th 2008, 
and in particular the article 19 of the same Treaty, the Tripoli Declaration of January 21st 
2012 and other agreements and memorandums signed on the subject. 
The Parties have taken cognizance of the Italy commitment in the dialogue and cooperation 
relaunching with the African countries of priority relevance for the migration routes, which 
led to the ‘Fund for Africa’ establishment. 
Considering the Italian initiatives implemented pursuant previous agreements and 
memorandums of bilateral understanding, besides the support ensured to the revolution of 
February 17th. In order to achieve solutions regarding some matters that negatively affect 
the Parties, including the irregular immigration phenomenon and its impact, the fight against 
terrorism, the human trafficking and fuel contraband. 
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Reaffirming the resolute determination of cooperating to individuate urgent solutions to the 
irregular migrants matter which cross Libya to go to Europe by sea, through the provision 
of temporary hosting camps in Libya, under the exclusive control of the Libyan Interior 
Ministry, in anticipation of repatriation or voluntary return to the countries of origin, 
working at the same time so that countries of origin accept their own citizens, that is signing 
agreements with these countries in regard to. 
Recognizing that measures and initiatives undertaken to solve the irregular migrants’ 
situation in accordance with this Memorandum don’t have to damage in any way the Libyan 
social fabric or threaten the demographic equilibrium of the Country or the economic 
situation and the security conditions of Libyan citizens. 
Highlighting the importance of Libyan land and sea borders’ control and security, in order 
to ensure the reduction of illegal migratory fluxes, the fight against human trafficking and 
fuel contraband, besides highlighting the importance of benefiting from the experience of 
the institutions involved in the fight against the irregular immigration and the borders’ 
control.  
Considering the obligations coming from the international common law and the agreements 
which bind the Parties, including the Italy membership in the European Union, in the 
framework of the systems in force in the two Countries, the two Parties confirm the 
cooperation wish to implement the dispositions and purposes of this Memorandum agreeing 
on what follows: 
Article 1 
The Parties commit to:  
A) start cooperation initiatives in conformity with programs and activities adopted by the 
Presidential Council and the National Agreement Government of the Libya State, in 
reference to the security and military institutions’ support in order to stem the illegal 
migrants’ fluxes and face the consequences coming from them, in accord with what foresees 
the Treaty of friendship, partnership and cooperation signed by the two countries and 
agreements and memorandum of understanding signed by Parties. 
B) the Italian party provides support and financing to development programs in the regions 
affected by the illegal immigration phenomenon within different sectors, such as renewable 
energy, infrastructure, health, transports, human resource development, teaching, personnel 
training and scientific research. 
 93 
C) the Italian party commits to provide technical and technologic support to the Libyan 
institutions in charge of the fight against illegal immigration, and that are represented by 
Defense Ministry border guard and the coast guard and Interior Ministry competent organs 
and departments. 
Article 2 
In addition, The Parties commit to undertake actions in the following sectors: 
1) completion of the land borders’ control system of south Libya, according to what foreseen 
by the above-mentioned article 19 of the Treaty. 
2) compliance and financing of the above-mentioned hosting centers already active in 
respect of the pertinent laws, benefiting from available funds by Italy and funds by European 
Union. The Italian party contributes through medicines and medical equipment supply for 
the health hosting centers in order to fulfil the illegal immigrants’ medical needs, treatment 
of transferable and serious chronic diseases. 
3) the Libyan personnel training within the above-mentioned hosting centers to face the 
illegal immigrants’ conditions, supporting the Libyan research centers which operate in this 
field so that they can contribute in the individuation of the most adequate methods to face 
the irregular immigration phenomenon and human trafficking. 
4) the Parties collaborate to propose within three months from the signature of this 
memorandum, a wider and more complete Euro-African cooperation view, to eliminate the 
causes of irregular immigration, in order to support the countries of origin of immigration in 
the implementation of development strategic projects, raise the level of tertiary sectors so 
that to improve the life standard and the health conditions, and contribute to the poverty and 
unemployment reduction. 
5) support to the present international organizations and that operate in Libya in the 
migration sector in order to continue the efforts also aiming to the migrants’ return to their 
countries of origin, including the voluntary return. 
6) start of development programs through adequate job creation initiatives within the Libyan 
regions affected by illegal immigration phenomena, human trafficking and contraband, as 
“income replacement”. 
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Article 3 
In order to accomplish the purposes of this Memorandum, the parties commit to establish a 
mixed committee composed of the same number of members between the parties to 
individuate the action priority, identify financing, implementation and monitoring 
instruments of the commitments undertaken. 
Article 4 
The Italian party provides the financing of the initiatives mentioned in this Memorandum or 
the ones proposed by the mixed committee indicated in the previous article without 
additional obligations for the Italian State budget in respect of the allocations already 
foreseen, besides making use of available funds from European Union, in respect of the laws 
in force in the two countries. 
Article 5 
The Parties commit to interpret and apply the present Memorandum in respect of the 
international obligations and the human rights agreements of which the two Countries are 
part of. 
Article 6 
The disputes between the Parties regarding the present Memorandum’s interpretation and 
application will be friendly negotiated by diplomatic means. 
Article 7 
The present Memorandum of understanding can be modified on request of one of the two 
Parties though a notes’ exchange during its forcefulness period. 
Article 8 
The present Memorandum comes into force in effect at the signature. It has triennial validity 
and it will be renovated by tacit agreement at the deadline for an equivalent period, unless 
written notification by one of the two contracting Parties, at least three months before the 
deadline of the period of validity. 
Elaborated and signed in Rome on February 2nd 2017 in two original copies, each one in 
Arabic language and Italian language, all texts equally maintained. 
For the National Reconciliation Government of the Libya State Fayez Mustafa Serraj 
President of the Presidential Council for the Government of Italian Republic Paolo Gentiloni 
President of the Ministers’ Council 
Translated by Sandra Uselli 
